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Abstract 
The provision of assurance services, most notably the audit function, is an activity of public 
protection that requires a high degree of independence between the auditor and the audit 
client to ensure audit quality is achieved. Internationally, especially in the European Union, 
there is a legislated move towards mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) to ensure auditor 
independence. South Africa is currently faced with the decision of whether to change 
legislation and follow suit.  
Using a qualitative and descriptive methodology, through the use of semi-structured and 
open interviews with experienced South African audit partners, the direct and indirect effects 
of mandatory firm rotation on the audit profession was explored. This study will therefore 
present the opinions of the regulator and a small group of experienced audit partners, most 
being regional or national managing partners, from audit firms that perform public interest 
entity audits. Of particular interest will be the opinions of the respondents around (1) the 
state of independence in South Africa, (2) whether mandatory audit firm rotation will 
increase audit quality, (3) whether there are better alternatives to mandatory audit firm 
rotation, and (4) what the perceived direct and indirect effects of mandatory rotation will be 
within the South African legal and regulatory context. A particular emphasis is also placed on 
the argument from the national audit regulator that mandatory audit firm rotation, in 
addition to strengthening independence, will also reduce market concentration (promote 
competition) in the South African audit industry, as well as promote black economic 
transformation. 
The results show significant disagreement by the audit practitioners against the arguments 
in favour of mandatory audit firm rotation, with most claiming that it will not achieve an 
increase in audit quality and will produce many unintended consequences that will in their 
opinion actually reduce audit quality. There is a significant amount of agreement amongst 
the audit partners on the key issues and no partner interviewed is fully in favour of changing 
legislation to require MAFR. A number of alternative means for improving audit quality are 
suggested, which in the opinion of many of the partners, will be less damaging to audit 
quality and the audit profession. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The provision of assurance services, most notably the audit function, is an activity of public 
protection. In the eyes of the public, especially the investing public and all stakeholders of 
the company, the audit function provides the much needed stamp of credibility and 
assurance as to the fair presentation of the company’s financial reporting. As clearly stated 
in both the International Standards of Auditing, notably ISA 200 (Overall Objectives of the 
Independent Auditor) and ISQC 1 (the quality control standard), as well as the professional 
conduct codes that govern assurance services, the auditor must act at all times with the 
required independence, objectivity and professional scepticism that is required for the 
purposes of providing an audit opinion on the fair presentation of the company’s financial 
statements (ISA 200, para. 14 and 15, International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2009).  
Auditor independence is important because it has an impact on audit quality. DeAngelo 
(1981), as quoted by many recent studies on audit quality, suggests that audit quality can be 
defined as the probability that: 
(a) The auditor will uncover a breach of statutory or regulatory requirement and
(b) Report the breach to the appropriate parties.
If auditors do not remain independent, they might be less likely to report irregularities or 
insist that financial statements be prepared to their satisfaction, thus, impairing audit 
quality (Carey and Simnett, 2006). This potentially lessens the credibility of the financial 
reporting process.  
The number of studies on the topic of auditor independence that have been performed to 
date (Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercey, 2014; Carey & Simnett, 2006; Daniels & Booker, 2011; 
Tepalagul & Lin, 2015), is understandable given its importance to the quality of the audit. If 
auditors, due to a lack of independence from the client, acquiesce to the financial reporting 
decisions of client management, they might be less likely to report irregularities uncovered 
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during the audit, through the various reporting channels available. The most notable 
reporting channel is via the auditor’s opinion and the audit report in which that opinion is 
contained, and therefore a lack of independence could impair the quality of the audit report 
provided to the public and stakeholders of the company. 
Recent research by Tepalagul and Lin (2015) provides a useful four dimensional approach 
with which to assess the impact of auditor independence on audit quality, namely, (a) client 
importance, (b) non-audit services, (c) auditor tenure, and (d) client affiliation with audit 
firms. This categorisation of the four main threats to auditor independence is useful for 
further research and theory and will be used in this paper, as shown diagrammatically in 
Figure 1.  
The audit profession in most international jurisdictions is a profitable and competitive 
enterprise as well as a necessary public practice. Therefore, like any business, the auditors 
have profit incentives to yield to client pressure to retain their business, especially the 
business of their most significant clients, which in turn compromises auditor independence 
(Tepalagul and Lin, 2015). Added to this potential compromise of independence is the 
reality that many audit clients require non-assurance services from their auditors, which are 
often more lucrative than the audit fee (Tepalagul and Lin, 2015), possibly resulting again in 
compromised independence in the audit engagement (Tepalagul and Lin, 2015). These 
threats to independence are explained at length in the IFAC Code of Professional Conduct 
whereby numerous guidelines are provided to enable the auditor to manage these conflicts 
of interest. Long auditor-client tenure and client affiliation with audit firms create familiarity 
between the parties as relationships form. The IFAC Code of Professional Conduct describes 
a familiarity threat, as well as a self-interest threat to independence due to longer tenures 
(Section 290:151, International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2006). The profits from 
non-audit services, provided by the audit firms, create self-interest threats to 
independence. These various threats may threaten auditor independence and audit quality. 
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Source: Tepalagul and Lin (2015) 
 
As can also be seen from Figure 1, audit quality, which results in quality financial reporting 
of companies, is a function of the capabilities and the independence of the auditor. 
However, the threats to auditor independence negatively impact on this quality. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the opinions of experienced audit practitioners with 
regards to legislated audit firm rotation, considering that the South African audit regulator 
(IRBA) views mandatory rotation as a possible partial solution to the threats of familiarity to 
auditor independence. The views of the audit profession, which acts as an important 
stakeholder in the pursuit of quality financial reporting, need to be understood in order to 
explore the possible direct and indirect consequences of changing legislation in favour of 
firm rotation. The response by audit practitioners to key questions around the need for, and 
the effects of, audit firm rotation, will be useful to academics in performing further research 
in this area, as well as to regulators, most notably the IRBA. Open-ended interviews will be 
the means of collecting the opinions of audit practitioners. Regulators and others have 
suggested that long auditor tenures may compromise auditor independence and be 
associated with increased likelihood of audit failures, and have implemented mandatory 
auditor rotation as one possible solution. In some jurisdictions, most notably the European 
Union, regulators have proceeded one significant step further and implemented a system of 
mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). 
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The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 summarises the current state of auditor 
rotation regulations internationally as well as in South Africa, followed by a review of the 
academic literature regarding auditor independence and the effects of auditor rotation and 
full audit firm rotation. Chapter 3 describes the qualitative methodology employed to 
understand the perceptions of experienced practising registered auditors with regards to 
audit firm rotation in a South African context. The means by which the data was collected 
(open ended interviews) and how it was analysed is described. Chapter 4 presents the 
findings of the research, describing the breadth of the themes and issues raised by the 
registered auditors interviewed and presenting these findings in a thematic and organised 
manner. Chapter 5 provides a brief summary and conclusion of the findings, including areas 
for further research around audit firm rotation in a South African context. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
The following literature review will begin by briefly describing the recent legislative 
developments around auditor tenure and rotation, as well as the current requirements in 
key international jurisdictions such as the United States (US), Europe and the United 
Kingdom (UK). The comparison will then be made with the South African legislative 
framework. Following this, a review of academic literature regarding auditor independence 
and auditor rotation will be performed with particular emphasis on the issue of auditor 
rotation.  
 
Auditor rotation has been enforced in many countries as a primary means to ensure auditor 
independence and thereby promote audit quality (Cameran, Vincenzo, & Merlotti, 2005). 
However, since the major financial corporate failures that have occurred in recent years, 
there has been considerable interest in mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR), not simply 
audit partner rotation, as a means to protect auditor independence. A few examples of such 
corporate collapses are Enron (2001), WorldCom (2001), Parmalat (2003), African Bank 
(South Africa 2015), Banco Espírito Santo (Portugal 2014) and the financial institutions at the 
centre of the 2008/9 financial crisis, such as AIG and Lehman Brothers. These are just a few 
examples among many whereby the quality of the audit function as a means to prevent or 
detect corporate fraud and gross mismanagement has been challenged (Laurion, Lawrence, 
& Ryans, 2015). Examples such as these have resulted in the questioning of auditor rotation, 
beyond academic circles, into a broader number of regulator and government institutions, 
such as the European Union Commission, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Cameran et al., 2005). Given 
the significance of threats to auditor independence, as discussed above and illustrated in 
Figure 1, a better solution to ensuring auditor independence and audit quality is being 
sought, with many believing that MAFR is perhaps that solution. According to Jackson, 
Moldrich, & Roebuck (2008) there is a need to determine whether the current international 
regulations of auditor rotation are enough to restore public confidence in the audit 
profession, or whether further regulatory changes, such as a system of MAFR are desirable. 
There has also been a call for further research on this topic by both the international 
standard setters and academics (Jackson et al., 2008). 
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The literature review will therefore lead beyond auditor independence and auditor rotation 
into the few studies and findings that have been documented regarding mandatory audit 
firm rotation itself (MAFR), which is the focus area of this study. 
 
International Developments 
In recent years, most notably since the collapse of Enron in 2001, regulators have expressed 
concerns about auditor independence and taken actions to mitigate those concerns (Laurion 
et al., 2015). These include the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, also known 
as the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act", which is United 
States (US) legislation that, among many other requirements, prohibits the auditor (in a US 
context) from providing most non-audit services to its clients. More specifically, SOX 
imposes a one-year “cooling-off period” for former auditors taking employment at their 
previous audit clients and requires audit partners to rotate every five years. In terms of SOX, 
the US also shifted from a seven-year rotation with a two-year cooling-off period (before 
SOX), to a stricter five-year rotation and five-year cooling-off period for audit engagements. 
More specifically the requirement is to rotate (1) the partner having primary responsibility 
for the audit and (2) the partner responsible for reviewing the audit, every five years. The 
audit committee is required to ensure that the requisite rotation actually takes place 
(Tepalagul and Lin, 2015). 
 
In the European Union (EU), regulations have also recently changed. The European 
Parliament in 2014 voted in favour of Directive 2014/56/EU, amending Directive 2006/43/EC 
on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts (European Commission, 
2015). These new rules force European companies to hire new audit firms at 10- to 24-year 
intervals, depending on certain criteria, bringing mandatory audit firm rotation into one of 
the world’s most significant economic regions (KPMG, 2014). More specifically, public 
interest entities have to appoint a new firm of auditors every 10 years. However, member 
states have the option to extend this maximum period to 20 years (24 if there is a joint 
audit) provided the audit is subject to a public tendering carried out after 10 years. These 
new rules require European-listed companies, banks and financial institutions to appoint a 
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new audit firm every 10 years, though this can be extended if companies put their audit 
contract up for bid at the decade mark or appoint another audit firm to do a joint-audit. The 
rules also prohibit certain non-audit consulting services and cap the amount of additional 
fees auditors can charge their clients (to 70%). The laws are expected to apply from mid-
June 2016 (KPMG, 2014).  
 
It is expected that the United Kingdom (UK) will also implement mandatory firm rotation in 
the near future. Currently, UK companies are required to re-tender, or explain why they 
have decided not to re-tender, every 10 years. There has recently been a change in UK 
regulations in this regard. In 2012, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) introduced a 
provision in the UK Corporate Governance Code for FTSE 350 companies to consider 
tendering their audit appointment every 10 years, on a comply or explain basis. The 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) finished its long running investigation of the UK 
large company statutory audit market in October 2013 and concluded that tendering of the 
audit appointment should be mandatory for FTSE 350 companies at least every 10 years. 
The ruling is now effective from June 2016 (Agnew, 2016). In addition to the mandatory 
tender after 10 years, it is expected that UK companies will have to appoint a new auditor 
every 20 years (PWC, 2014). 
 
As can be seen in the comparison between the US regulations of auditor rotation and the 
recently adopted EU and the UK audit firm rotation regulations, there is a difference 
between auditor rotation (i.e. the audit engagement partner) and audit firm rotation, 
although sometimes the terms are used too loosely and the distinction is lost. Auditor 
rotation, as in the US and South Africa, refers to the mandatory rotation of the engagement 
audit partner after a prescribed five years. Under auditor rotation the audit firm retains the 
client, providing a different audit partner to the engagement. There is then a “cooling-off” 
period (five years in the US, two years in South Africa) whereby the rotated audit partner 
must wait until being allowed to be reappointed as engagement partner on that client. 
However, audit firm rotation, as is now being adopted in 2016 by the EU, is a step further 
than this. It requires a change of the audit firm, not simply the audit partner. The audit firm 
effectively loses the business of the audit client, regardless of whether or not the partners in 
the firm are suitable and capable of performing the audit. The EU has adopted this in an 
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attempt to further mitigate the threats (particularly familiarity) to auditor independence, 
thereby protecting audit quality (KPMG, 2014).  
 
Other than the more significant recent examples of the UK and the EU, other countries such 
as Brazil, India, Italy, Spain, Singapore and South Korea have required, and some still do 
require, audit firm rotation (MAFR) after a maximum specified period (Cameran et al., 
2005). As mentioned, the US is a notable exception against this international trend and the 
European Union therefore remains the largest economic jurisdiction to apply MAFR rules.  
 
To follow, a brief description of the current state of legislation in South Africa is provided.  
 
The context in South Africa 
Currently South Africa does not legislate the mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) laws as 
have been implemented in the EU, but rather follows a system similar to the US, with 
auditor rotation (i.e. individual audit partner) required every five years. This includes a 
cooling-off period of two years, as prescribed by section 92 of the Companies Act, 2008 (Act 
No. 71 of 2008). The profession in South Africa also places a large degree of reliance on the 
professions ethical standards in order to internally assess (or self-assess) threats to its 
independence as auditor. These standards are contained in the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISAs), as well as the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants (the IFAC Code). In terms of this code, the 
engagement audit partner on a publically listed entity should rotate off the client after no 
longer than seven years (Section 290:154, International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 
2006). These are internationally recognised standards for which the auditor can assess their 
independence from the audit client.  
 
In South Africa there is also regulation and guidance provided to the audit committee of 
public interest entities to assess the independence of the auditor. This is legislated in the 
South African Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008). Guidance is also provided to audit 
committees in the King Report on Governance (King III), which is the South African standard 
on issues of corporate governance, soon to be replaced with the King IV Report. As an 
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example, the Companies Act requires the audit committee to formally assess the 
independence of the auditor. However, legislation, standards and regulations of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) have all stopped short of requiring mandatory audit firm 
tendering or audit firm rotation as is now being implemented in the EU and the UK.  
Impact of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation 
The following is a review of the literature on the effects of auditor tenure on audit quality, 
followed by the specific impact of audit firm rotation on audit quality. More studies have 
been performed on audit tenure in comparison to full audit firm rotation (MAFR), owing to 
the relatively recent move of jurisdictions such as the European Union and the UK towards 
MAFR. Literature around other aspects of auditor independence is then discussed, namely 
auditor-client preferences and the division between company management and the audit 
committee.  
Lastly the literature regarding the perceptions of audit practitioners with respect to partner 
rotation, including their perceived direct and indirect effects of such rotation is reviewed.   
 
The Effect of Audit Tenure on Audit Quality 
A study by Tepalagul and Lin (2015) consisted of a comprehensive review of academic 
research pertaining to auditor independence and audit quality. Through a review of 
published articles during the period 1976-2013 in nine leading journals related to auditing, 
most studies concluded that long auditor tenure does not impair independence (Tepalagul 
& Lin, 2015). However, according to Tepalagul and Lin (2015) there are two opposing views 
on the effects of auditor tenure on audit quality. One states that as the auditor-client 
relationship lengthens, the auditor may develop a close relationship with the client and 
become more likely to act in favour of management, thus reducing audit quality. This is the 
typical familiarity threat argument for auditor rotation, as described in Section 290 of the 
IFAC Code (IFAC, 2006). Therefore, this view supports some form of regular audit partner or 
audit firm rotation. Controlling the time by which an auditor is engaged with the client 
(auditor tenure) is a means to reduce the familiarity threat and promote independence of 
mind and action by the auditor. The other view was that as auditor tenure lengthens, 
auditors increase their understanding of their clients’ business and improve their expertise, 
resulting in higher audit quality (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). For example, client-specific 
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experience, a proxy for expertise, was found to enhance the auditors’ ability to respond to 
fraud indicators (Brazel, Carpenter, & Jenkins, 2010). These two views provide conflicting 
results on whether or not to pursue MAFR, as one argues the possible benefits of auditor 
tenure, and the other the possible cost. 
 
A Belgium study by Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) that used a sample of stressed bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt companies, found that auditors do not become less independent over 
time nor do they become better at predicting bankruptcy. According to Knechel and 
Vanstraelen (2007), the evidence for tenure either increasing or decreasing audit quality is 
weak.  
 
Other researchers again produce conflicting findings on the association between auditor 
tenure and auditor behaviour. In a study of audits of US public schools, Deis and Giroux 
(1992) report that quality-control findings decrease as auditor tenure lengthens. Using data 
for audit partner tenure in Australia for a period where partner rotation was not mandatory, 
the relationship between audit quality and long audit partner tenure was investigated by 
Carey and Simnett (2006). The three measures (proxies) of audit quality examined were 1) 
the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion for distressed companies, 2) the 
direction and amount of abnormal working capital accruals, and 3) just beating (missing) 
earnings benchmarks. For long tenure observations the results showed a lower propensity 
to issue a going concern opinion and some evidence of just beating (missing) earnings 
benchmarks, consistent with deterioration in audit quality associated with long audit 
partner tenure (Carey and Simnett, 2006).  
 
Further conflicting results were identified by Johnson, Khurana, & Kenneth Reynolds (2002) 
who examined whether the length of the relationship between a company and an audit firm 
(audit firm tenure) is associated with financial reporting quality. Johnson et al. (2002) 
categorised auditor-client relationships into periods of short, medium and long tenures. 
Using two proxies for financial reporting quality, based on accounting accruals, and a sample 
of large audit firm clients matched on industry and size, Johnson et al. (2002) found that 
relative to medium audit firm tenures of four to eight years, short audit firm tenures of two 
to three years are associated with lower-quality financial reporting. Again, in contrast to the 
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shorter periods, Johnson et al. (2002) found no evidence of reduced financial reporting 
quality for longer audit firm tenures of nine or more years.  
 
A US study on the raising of going concern (financial distress) uncertainties by auditors 
suggests that audit failures are more likely in the early years of the auditor-client 
relationship (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). The results were consistent with the position 
that auditors may be more influenced by their newly obtained clients in the earlier years of 
the engagement. Therefore this does not support that auditor rotation be made mandatory 
or that long tenure reduces audit quality.  
 
Bamber and Iyer (2007) used a theory-based measure for the extent to which auditors 
identify with a client, which was then used to directly measure auditors' attachment to the 
client and consequently the threat of this attachment to auditors' objectivity. The responses 
of 252 practising auditors were obtained, providing support for the  predictions of Bamber 
and Iyer (2007). Specifically, Bamber and Iyer (2007) found that auditors do identify with 
their clients and that auditors who identify more with a client are more likely to agree with 
the client preferred position on an audit and financial reporting matter. However, more 
experienced auditors and auditors who exhibit higher levels of professional identification 
are less likely to acquiesce to the client's position. Differing incentives were identified for 
the partner in comparison to the firm. The incentive of the individual audit partner may 
conflict with that of the audit firm so that long partner tenure increases the likelihood of the 
auditor acquiescing to the client’s preferences, whereas audit firm tenure is associated with 
the decreased likelihood of auditor concessions (Bamber & Iyer, 2007). By looking at the 
differing incentives of the firm as a whole, compared to that of the individual partner in the 
firm, the results implies that, unlike an audit partner, an audit firm may have stronger 
reputational incentives to remain independent. Therefore, rotating the firm in a system of 
MAFR, as opposed to the partner, may not be the best means to achieve independence and 
audit quality. 
 
An investigation into the effects of audit partner rotation among US publicly listed 
companies by Laurion et al. (2015) used a sample of US partner rotations and non-rotations, 
revealed that partner rotations result in substantial increases in material restatements 
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(124.8%) and total valuation allowances and reserves (0.8% of assets). This suggests that US 
partner rotations do provide a fresh look at the audit engagement. 
 
Researchers have also explored the impact of partner rotation on auditor effort and audit 
quality. There is empirical evidence that the effort provided by the auditor, or invested by 
the auditor into the engagement, increases following a rotation of the audit partner. Bedard 
and Johnstone (2010) showed evidence that planned engagement effort increases following 
partner rotation, suggesting that new partners apply themselves and their resources more 
to gain client knowledge in the first year on the engagement. This suggests that new 
partners work harder to reduce the information asymmetry that they face in directing a 
first-time audit (Bedard & Johnstone, 2010). In this way, a “fresh set of eyes” is a benefit to 
the audit and would be a positive aspect of partner or firm  rotation (Bedard & Johnstone, 
2010). 
 
In conclusion, there are mixed results around the effect that partner rotation has on 
independence and audit quality. However, as noted by Tepalagul and Lin (2015), most 
studies conclude that audit tenure does not impair independence, even though there does 
appear to be benefits to partner rotation, such as a more conservative and diligent 
approach to the audit by the incoming partner. 
 
The Effect of Audit Firm Rotation on Audit Quality 
Recent studies have mostly concerned themselves with audit partner (auditor) rotation 
(Bowlin et al., 2014; Daugherty et al., 2012; Laurion et al., 2015; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015), 
rather than audit firm rotation. According to the South African Independent Regulatory 
Board for Auditors (IRBA), since the audit failures associated with Enron, larger corporates in 
South Africa and major financial institutions across the globe, the independence of auditors 
and regulators have become a focal point for governments and oversight structures (IRBA, 
2015a). It is for this reason that the recent European Union legislation concentrates on 
improving independence rotation of audit firms after a fixed period of 20 years; a cap on the 
amount of fees for non-audit services at 70 per cent of the audit fee; and encouragement 
for companies to adopt joint audits (Hay, 2015). Investors and the public are also 
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demanding more information and transparency and have become more aware of their 
rights to be protected (IRBA, 2015a). However, there is very little research on the 
effectiveness and consequences of audit firm rotation specifically. According to Hay (2015) 
the rotation of audit firms is a difficult area to research because there are so few practical 
situations where it has been enforced. As a result, “there is no clear evidence about 
whether it is effective” (Hay, 2015). According to Bédard and Compernolle, the authors of 
chapter 20 of “The Routledge Companion to Auditing” (2014), as quoted by Hay (2015), 
“academic research has been unable to provide clear answers about the consequences of 
mandatory audit firm rotation”. 
 
Two leading studies that have been performed in this area of mandatory audit firm rotation 
(MAFR), namely 1) Jackson, Moldrich, and Roebuck (2008) and 2) Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-
Aguilar, and Carrera (2009) are not in favour of pursuing mandatory audit firm rotation. 
 
Jackson et al. (2008) investigated the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation in Australia on 
audit quality. Two measures of audit quality were used; 1) the propensity to issue a going-
concern report and 2) the level of discretionary accruals. The main finding was that audit 
quality increases with audit firm tenure, when proxied by the propensity to issue a going-
concern opinion, and is unaffected when proxied by the level of discretionary expenses. 
Given the additional costs associated with switching auditors as described by Jackson et al. 
(2008), it was concluded that there are minimal, if any, benefits of mandatory audit firm 
rotation (Jackson et al., 2008). However, only actual audit quality was examined and while 
the results suggest that actual audit quality is associated with the length of audit firm 
tenure, the perception of audit quality by market participants was not addressed. 
Perception of audit quality is important, as described in the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) Code of Ethics for auditors (section 290:8), as the need for the auditor to 
have independence in both mind and in appearance to a third party (International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2006). The audit opinion provides assurance to the 
market and the public of the credibility of the financial statements, as explained in the 
International Standards on Auditing, and therefore this independence of the auditor in the 
eyes of the market is necessary. According to ISA 200, the audit enhances “the degree of 
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confidence of intended users in the financial statements”(ISA 200:3, International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2009).  
 
Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009) suggested that auditors’ incentives to protect their reputation 
has a positive impact on the likelihood of them reporting going concern uncertainties. In 
addition, auditors’ incentives to retain existing clients did not impact on their decisions in 
both the mandatory rotation (1991-1994) and post-mandatory rotation (1995-2000) periods 
in Spain.  
 
The research of Jackson et al. (2008) and Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009), both provide evidence 
against pursuing mandatory firm rotation. 
 
A study on audit perception with regard to audit firm rotation was performed by Daniels 
and Booker (2011), exploring loan officers’ perceptions of auditor independence and audit 
quality in circumstances with and without firm rotation. Loan officer responses indicated 
that these officers do perceive an increase in auditor independence when the company 
follows an audit firm rotation policy. However, the length of auditor tenure within rotation 
failed to significantly change loan officers’ perceptions of independence.  
 
In conclusion, the studies in the previous section regarding auditor tenure showed mixed 
results. However, the few studies shown in this section that focus on the effects of audit 
firm rotation, rather than partner rotation and auditor tenure, indicate that firm rotation 
does not improve actual audit quality. These findings are not in favour of audit firm rotation. 
However, the research around firm rotation is sparse and does not sufficiently consider the 
impact of such rotation on the credibility of financial statements and perceptions of audit 
quality by the users of these financial statements. From a South African perspective there is 
also the need, as communicated by the South African regulator (IRBA), to consider the effect 
of audit firm rotation on market competition in the audit industry (market concentration) 
and national transformation objectives (IRBA, 2015a). No studies to date have addressed 
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Auditor-client preferences 
Experimental research by Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2001) was designed to assess 
whether mandatory rotation and/or retention of auditors increases auditors’ independence 
by reducing their willingness to issue reports biased in favour of management. Auditors’ 
reporting was compared across regulations of mandatory rotation, or mandatory retention, 
including scenarios whereby neither was required. The findings of Dopuch et al. (2001) 
showed that within the regulations that required rotation only, or both rotation and 
retention, there was decreased auditor willingness to issue biased reports, relative to the 
other regimes in which rotation was not imposed. Therefore client-preferred reporting by 
auditors was concluded to be less likely under mandatory rotation (Dopuch et al., 2001).  
 
Regarding firm rotation specifically, an experimental study by Wang and Tuttle (2009), 
building on the findings of Dopuch et al. (2001), but incorporating negotiation theories, 
investigated the process differences in auditor-client negotiations under conditions with and 
without mandatory audit firm rotation. As is the nature of auditing, where there are 
uncertainties requiring a significant use of professional judgement and estimates in applying 
the financial reporting standards, differing opinions regarding asset values, accounting 
estimates and application of accounting standards are likely to arise between management 
and the auditor (Wang and Tuttle, 2009). Management have the incentive to apply 
accounting standards and provide estimates in such a manner so as to increase asset values 
and reported profit, in comparison to auditors. Negotiation is therefore often required 
between management and the auditor in settling occasional disagreements of opinion 
around financial reporting issues and identified audit misstatements where adjustments are 
proposed by the auditor.  
 
Wang and Tuttle (2009) also acknowledged that different incentives exist for managers and 
auditors and therefore, these differing incentives can lead client managers and auditors to 
prefer different values within the range of acceptable possibilities. Hence, auditor-client 
negotiation is a natural process of reconciling these differences in incentive-induced 
preferences. The results suggested that under mandatory firm rotation, negotiation results 
are closer to the preference of the auditor than that of the client. This implies that with 
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mandatory rotation, auditors adopt less co-operative negotiation strategies (Wang & Tuttle, 
2009).  
 
Hatfield, Jackson, and Vandervelde (2011) contributed to the debate around auditor and 
audit firm rotation through analysing the effects of prior auditor involvement and client 
pressure on proposed audit adjustments. The results revealed that auditors who have no 
involvement in waiving a prior period audit adjustment propose current period audit 
adjustments that are significantly larger than auditors who have involvement in waiving a 
prior period audit adjustment (Hatfield et al., 2011). The results of Hatfield et al. (2011) have 
implications for the consideration of auditor rotation, including firm rotation. The “no prior 
involvement” condition in the study mirrors the situation in which there is either audit 
partner rotation or audit firm rotation, and the “prior involvement” condition mirrors the 
situation in which there is a recurring audit firm or audit team. The results suggest that 
either form of rotation will likely increase the magnitude of proposed audit adjustments. 
This is a similar conclusion to Laurion et al. (2015).  
The management-audit committee divide  
Related to the auditor-client preference, as discussed above, an issue at the heart of auditor 
independence debates is the concern that the auditor may advocate for management, 
rather than view the market, the shareholders or the public as the real client (Buffet and 
Clark, 2006). Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) performed an extensive review that synthesized 
recent empirical research around the audit committee’s role in corporate governance. Much 
of the findings of Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) fall in support of regulatory strengthening 
of audit committee experience and its involvement in governance of companies. The review 
of evidence by Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) supports the idea that larger and more 
independent audit committees as well as those with financial expertise are more likely to 
seek a higher level of external audit coverage and assurance, as well as the purchase of 
lower levels of non-audit services from auditors, thereby seeking to preserve the 
independence of the external audit process. Smaller, less experienced and less independent 
audit committees are susceptible to poor oversight of the external audit process. There 
seems to be a consensus that more independent audit committees and those with greater 
accounting or financial expertise have a positive impact on the quality of financial 
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statements (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2013). This is in spite of the fact that, even in large 
corporate environments with larger and more independent audit committees, management 
does still have some influence over the auditor (Bedard and Johnstone, 2010). 
 
Case-study based research by Fiolleau et al. (2013), using a large US public company, 
explored the validity of the divide between audit committee and management as it relates 
to the auditor decision. The listed company analysed was perceived to have a good quality 
and regulatory-compliant audit committee by Fiolleau et al. (2013). The dominant view in 
both academic literature (Bedard & Johnstone, 2010; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 
2010; Fiolleau et al., 2013; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013) and the auditing profession, 
including regulation, is that the audit committee “owns” the auditor appointment process 
and has primary responsibility in assessing the independence and suitability of the auditor 
before making the appointment decision. As an example, in South Africa these obligations of 
the audit committee to assess auditor independence are prescribed in the Companies Act, 
2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008). An alternative view, counter to the intention of the governance 
structures and policies, is that regulatory reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
United States, leave in place power relations whereby management is the dominant party 
who hires both the auditor and the directors on the audit committee. Due to management 
becoming the dominant party, the audit committee’s actions are likely to be ceremonial 
rather than substantive (Cohen et al., 2010).  Fiolleau et al. (2013) investigated how the 
audit committee interprets and executes its legislative mandate in appointing an 
independent external auditor and the role of management in these responsibilities. The 
findings of Fiolleau et al. (2013) was a limited involvement of the audit committee in the 
appointment process and decision. The audit committee abdicated its information gathering 
and decision-making responsibilities to management, serving rather as a witness to 
management’s selection process and decision. The audit firm that offered the least senior 
level expertise and the lowest fee obtained the engagement, despite management and the 
audit committee stating that the price was not a primary criterion or motivation for the 
decision. Fiolleau et al. (2013) argued that all auditors seek to convey more to the potential 
client than just technical expertise, as they need to differentiate themselves from 
competitors. Therefore, since auditors were focused on winning the client and were willing 
to cut fees, move partners to the client’s head office city, and curtail quality control. The 
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attitude of the auditors was to secure the appointment as a matter of priority and urgency, 
concerning themselves later about whatever issues might arise in the future (Fiolleau et al., 
2013). In the research pre and post the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Cohen et al. 
(2010) found that the independence of the audit committees had improved considerably, 
but not sufficiently. Many auditors surveyed reported that in their post-SOX experience, 
management continues to be the dominant player in auditor appointment and dismissal 
decisions, and only about half of the auditors felt audit committees play an important role in 
resolving auditor disputes with management (Cohen et al., 2010). 
 
These results, which show a tendency of the audit committee to represent the wishes of 
management, rather than provide an independent oversight, and its resultant effect on the 
behaviour of the external auditor who is attempting to secure appointment, raise some 
concern over the effectiveness of existing and proposed changes to auditing regulations 
attempting to govern auditor independence. The intention of regulations may not be met 
due to these incentives and decision making realities. Instead of strengthening 
independence and providing a “fresh look”, the auditor change process is dominated by 
management, not the audit committee, and is characterised by gestures from prospective 
auditors to win client favour, rather than submit a professional and work-related tender 
proposal. These influences could render any proposed (or existing) audit partner/firm 
rotation regulations ineffective because regulations do not appropriately consider the 
management-audit committee dependence (Fiolleau et al., 2013). According to the findings 
of  Fiolleau et al. (2013), researchers often attribute the inefficacy of regulatory reforms to 
the political power of the audit industry for adopting clever tactics to displace blame on 
individuals or other parties. Therefore, Fiolleau et al. (2013) suggest that client-management 
power, rather than audit industry politics, may be an important factor in undermining 
regulatory reforms. 
 
Research on interaction between external auditor and audit committee by Bédard and 
Compernolle (2014) shows that management still has some influence over the auditor, even 
when the audit committee is formally responsible (Hay, Knechel, & Willekens, 2014). These 
findings by Fiolleau et al. (2013), Cohen et al. (2010) and Bédard and Compernolle (2014), 
coupled with previously reported evidence that new auditors are not only more vulnerable 
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to fraud (Treadway, 1987) but also to errors in early years (Johnson et al., 2002), should be 
considered in any move towards more strict auditor/firm rotation regulations. 
 
Audit Partner Perceptions 
 After performing a survey of auditor perception, Shockley (1981) found that auditors do not 
regard tenure exceeding five years as reducing independence. Daugherty et al. (2012), in the 
wake of the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), used structured interviews and surveys 
of practising audit partners in order to examine US audit partner perceptions with regard to 
mandatory partner rotation and cooling-off periods. The survey also considered how 
recently enacted, more stringent rules, may negatively impact auditors’ quality of life to the 
detriment of audit quality. Daugherty et al. (2012) developed the following model of the 
direct and indirect effects of auditor rotation, as shown in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2. Model of Direct and Indirect Effects of Mandatory Rotation on Audit Quality 
Source: Daugherty et al. (2012) 
 
In Figure 2, auditor rotation is associated with increases in independence and a “fresh look” 
at the client, hence the positive (+) symbol, but can decrease the client specific knowledge 
of the business being audited, hence negative (-) symbol. There are also indirect negative 
effects of rotating audit partners, namely a decrease in quality of life of the audit partner 
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Daugherty et al. (2012) sought to test the direct and indirect effects of audit partner 
rotation through examining the opinions and perceptions of practising audit partners. 
Opinions were gathered around the impact of partner rotation on client-specific knowledge, 
independence, quality of life and the decision to relocate geographically for work as a result 
of auditor rotation.  Seven audit partners from across the US and from firms of varying sizes 
were interviewed using semi-structured interviews. In order to test the theoretical model 
developed, a field survey was created and distributed to 370 practising partners from 14 
firms, representing approximately 40 distinct practice office locations of varying size. Results 
suggested that auditor rotation can increase partners’ workloads and the likelihood of them 
needing to relocate for work. Additionally, results suggest that in response to accelerated 
rotation (and an extended cooling-off period), partners would prefer to learn a new 
industry, rather than relocate. Importantly, partners perceive audit quality suffers from 
retraining, but not from relocating. Thus, the results suggest an indirect, negative impact, 
and unintended consequence of accelerated rotation/extended cooling-off periods on audit 
quality (Daugherty et al., 2012). 
 
Another study focusing on audit partner perceptions and experiences was performed by 
Cohen et al. (2010). Using semi-structured interviews with 30 experienced audit partners 
and audit managers, from large tier audit firms, auditors reported that the corporate 
governance environment had improved considerably in the post-SOX era. Audit committees 
were substantially more active, diligent, knowledgeable, and powerful. However, in some 
instances Cohen et al. (2010) found that governance was still rather symbolic. Management 
continued to be seen as a major corporate governance decision maker and therefore the 
dominant player in the audit committee versus management roles as far as auditor 
appointment was concerned. As such, management was often the driving force behind 
auditor appointments and terminations. Some auditors reported that audit committees play 
a passive role in helping resolve disagreements with management (Cohen et al., 2010).  
 
The above two studies of partner perceptions follow a similar methodology to that applied 
in this study. The Daugherty et al. (2012) findings reveal perceived direct and indirect 
consequences in the audit profession from mandatory audit partner rotation. The Cohen et 
al. (2010) findings reveal perceptions of a lack of independence and quality in the 
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functioning of the audit committees. Both of these US-based studies have an application to 
MAFR debate, especially if similar sentiment is expressed by South African audit 
practitioners. These two studies are based on the perceptions of audit practitioners 
themselves and reveal some of the pushback from the audit profession against changing 
auditor rotation legislation and attempting to improve auditor independence by further 
regulating auditors, when the problems are believed to lie elsewhere. A survey of the audit 
profession performed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, as well as a 
collection of the arguments for and against mandatory audit firm rotation, produced similar 
arguments against changing legislation in Australia in favour of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. The report produced raised the concern that there would likely be significant 
unintended consequences to the auditing profession, and that the underlying causes of poor 
audit quality or auditor independence which may lie on the audit committee-management 
side of the engagement, would be unaddressed by such legislation (Institute of Chartered 




There is a move towards mandatory audit firm rotation in many developed economies, with 
the most significant and recent change in that direction being the European Union in 2014, 
with the United Kingdom soon to follow suit. Smaller countries such as Brazil, India, Italy, 
Spain, Singapore and South Korea have required audit firm rotation for some time now. The 
United States, at least for the moment has decidedly to remain with a system of partner 
rotation only, on a rotation period of five years, similar to that currently in place in South 
Africa.  
 
The literature reviewed presents mixed results regarding the impact of audit tenure on audit 
quality and auditor independence, with most studies however indicating that independence 
is not impaired as auditor tenure increases. Many studies however do show that incoming 
auditors are more conservative and diligent, making greater adjustments to the financial 
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Audit partners in the United States have expressed concerns around the direct and indirect 
effects on the profession of audit partner rotation, but this study did not consider audit firm 
rotation. United States audit partners also express concern around the proper functioning of 
the audit committees as necessary partners in maintaining the auditor-client relationship. 
Little research has been performed specifically on the link between firm rotation and audit 
quality, mostly because the move towards firm rotation regulations is very recent and 
therefore the impact of such regulations is yet to be seen. The studies that have analysed 
audit firm rotation in countries that have adopted it, such as Australia and Spain, are not in 
favour of audit firm rotation and do not show clear links to the improvement of auditor 
independence or audit quality.  
 
The indirect and unintended consequences of a move to mandatory firm rotation has not 
been studied, nor the perceptions of the various stakeholders involved in the audit process. 
In addition, no studies appears to have been published in a South African context around 
mandatory firm rotation. 
 
If the debate around MAFR has already been performed in Europe, the United Kingdom, the 
United States as well as other developed economies, an important question to answer at 
the outset, is “what is unique about the South African environment that justifies the need 
for South African-specific research regarding MAFR?”  
 
The following considerations are relevant to answering this question: 
1. The results of the 2014/15 Public Inspections Report around ethical compliance in 
South African audit firms (refer to Appendix 2) indicate a specific South African 
problem whereby independence of the auditor may be the underlying cause.  
2. The South African legislative environment, namely the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as 
well as accepted principles of corporate governance, are different from other 
countries. 
3. Black economic empowerment (transformation / affirmative action initiatives) is a 
specific priority in the economy, acknowledged by both business and government as 
an ethical and urgent national priority. South Africa’s history of Apartheid and its 
impact on the economy and society today has resulted in a widespread desire to 
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“level the playing field” and redress the inequalities of Apartheid by giving previously 
disadvantaged groups of South African citizens’ economic privileges previously not 
available to them. This has significant impact on the MAFR debate in South Africa. 
4. The South African national audit regulator (IRBA) has three main reasons for 
pursuing the question of MAFR, only one being to improve public protection through 
improved audit quality (refer to Appendix 2). Many other countries have considered 
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Chapter 3:  Research Methodology 
This section describes the rationale for the application of specific procedures or techniques 
used to identify, select, and analyse information applied to understanding the research 
problem. The purpose is firstly to answer the question of how the data was collected or 
generated; and secondly, how it was analysed.  
 
This is a descriptive study that employs a qualitative research methodology. Qualitative 
studies aim to explain the ways in which people come to understand and account for issues, 
event and behaviours in their lives. Therefore the data gathered covers the perceptions, 
opinions and reasoning of the participants based on their unique experiences of areas 
related to the topic studied.  
 
In order to explore the perceptions and opinions of the South African audit practitioners 
regarding the proposed move towards mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR), away from 
the current system of five year partner rotation, the first step employed, which is the 
purpose of this research, is to conduct semi-structured interviews with experienced 
partners across a number of audit firms nationally. The purpose of these semi-structured 
interviews study is to document the breadth of issues around MAFR from an audit 
practitioner perspective, so as to produce an appropriate and well balanced national field 
survey to be distributed to audit partners around South Africa, which is considered to be 
step two in the research (refer to Further Research in the Conclusion section).  
 
A semi-structured interview is a qualitative method of inquiry that combines a pre-
determined set of open-ended questions (questions that prompt discussion), with the 
opportunity for the researcher to explore particular themes or responses further. This type 
of interview does not limit respondents to a set of pre-determined answers, unlike a 
structured questionnaire for example (Dearnley, 2005). 
 
The purpose of the semi-structured interviews is to understand the breadth of issues and 
opinions around adopting MAFR in South Africa, as well as opinions regarding possible 
alternatives to, and unintended consequences of, MAFR. Therefore this study aims to 
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document the breadth of the issues and opinions using a small sample of audit partners so 
as to allow the second natural step in the research, which is produce and implement a 
comprehensive and appropriate field survey of the audit profession. This survey is to be sent 
more broadly to the profession where the intention will be to receive responses from a 
much larger sample of audit practitioners, i.e. audit partners around the country. Note that 
the second step is not the purpose of this thesis, but rather an important area for further 
research based on this study. 
 
This methodology of using semi-structured interviews to inform a much larger field survey 
study is similar to that performed by Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, and Higgs (2012) in their 
study entitled “An Examination of Partner Perceptions of Partner Rotation: Direct and 
Indirect Consequences to Audit Quality”. As opposed to the unstructured interview, semi-
structured interviews are often the sole data source for a qualitative research projects and 
are usually scheduled in advance at a designated time and location outside of everyday 
events (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). Such interviews are generally organised around 
a set of predetermined open-ended questions, with other questions emerging from the 
dialogue between interviewer and interviewee(s). Semi-structured in-depth interviews are 
the most widely used interviewing format for qualitative research and can occur either with 
an individual or in groups (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). The open nature of the 
questions encourages depth and vitality in the responses by the interviewees and allows 
new concepts to emerge over the course of the interviews (Dearnley, 2005). 
 
Key expert opinions 
Before selecting and interviewing the audit partners the input into the debate by three 
select expert individuals was sought, namely: 
 The Chief Executive Officer of the South African Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors (IRBA) 
  The Chairperson for the past five years of the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) Consultative Advisory Group (CAG) and Chair of the 
Financial Reporting Investigation Panel on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  
 The Chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance. 
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The reason for interviewing these three select individuals (refer to Appendix 2), was to 
understand the perspectives of other key decision makers and areas of expertise in the 
auditor independence debate. The CEO of the South African national audit regulator (IRBA) 
provided insight from a regulatory and protection of public interest perspective. The 
Chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance provided insight from the 
perspective of those charged with governance in the companies themselves (i.e. the board 
of directors and audit committees). A South African representative at the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), provided insight and perspective from 
recent international developments and discussions with regards to auditor independence, 
as well as a financial reporting considerations.  
 
These three interviews stand apart from the interviews of the audit partners and served to 
inform the researcher of the broader South African and international issues surrounding 
MAFR. The results of these discussions and the information gathered can be found in 
Appendix 2 and played a key role in the development of the semi-structured interview 
questions and understanding of the key issues by the researcher. Together with the 
literature review, this is vitally important to the researcher for partaking in the interviews 
appropriately and facilitating and guiding discussion. As is more fully discussed in Appendix 
2, many opinions, themes and priorities were raised as issues to which response and opinion 
is required from the South African audit profession. Therefore the open-ended interviews 
included these questions and perspectives which were expressed as relevant for the audit 
partners to respond to, such as: 
 Will MAFR strengthen auditor independence and so protect the public and 
investors? 
 Will MAFR address market concentration of audit services and create a more 
competitive environment? 
 Will MAFR promote transformation by creating more opportunities for small and 
mid-tier audit firms to enter certain markets? 
 Are small and mid-tier audit firms competent to audit the larger public interest 
entities? 
(Refer to Appendix 2) 
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The population and the selection 
The purpose of this study, with respect to the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) 
in South Africa, is to understand the perceptions and opinions of the audit practitioners. 
Therefore the population to be analysed is considered to be the “audit partners”, otherwise 
called “audit directors”, from the official list of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
accredited audit firms. Smaller, non-accredited audit firm practitioners have not been 
considered based on the reasoning that if MAFR is implemented in South Africa it would 
only apply to public interest entities, which the smaller audit practices do not service with 
assurance work. This is similar with international practice and implementation of MAFR. In 
terms of South African legislation, an audit partner (or audit firm) refers to an individual (or 
firm) registered as an auditor with the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA). 
An individual must apply the IRBA for registration as an auditor and must meet the 
prescribed minimum requirements as determined by the Auditing Profession Act, 2005 and 
by the IRBA (Auditing Profession Act, 2005). If registered in this manner then the individual 
is considered a “registered auditor” and is allowed by law to perform audit assurance 
services in public practice as prescribed by the above Act and in compliance with the 
auditing professions ethical and professional standards. 
 
This study employs a purposive sampling technique, also known as judgemental, selective or 
subjective sampling. Purposive sampling is a type of non-probability sampling which focuses 
on sampling techniques where the units that are investigated are based on the 
judgement of the researcher, rather than on statistical techniques (Tongco, 2007). Purposive 
sampling technique is most effective when one needs to study a certain domain which 
contains knowledgeable experts. According to Tongco (2007),in choosing a sampling 
method for informant selection, the question the researcher is interested in answering is of 
utmost importance and it is especially important to be clear on informant qualifications 
when using purposive sampling.  
 
Fourteen experienced practising “registered auditors” (audit partners) were selected from 
nine different audit firms in order to perform the interview (refer to table below). According 
to the book entitled “The Long Interview” by McCracken (1988), as cited in DiCicco-Bloom 
and Crabtree (2006), in-depth interviews are used to discover shared understandings of a 
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particular group and the sample of interviewees should be fairly homogenous and share 
critical similarities related to the research question. This selection of audit partners is 
therefore the homogenous group that share critical experience related to the research 
question. The selection is also considered to be fairly representative of the population of 
registered auditors in South Africa, especially considering that the audit partners selected 
were involved in the senior leadership of their respective audit practices and were 
considered sufficiently experienced as audit practitioners, having worked for many years in 
the capacity of audit partner.  
 
The commonly agreed and recognised distinction between the audit firms (Marx, 2009; 
Rapoport, 2016) has been used in this study and is as follows:  
 “Big four” audit firms refer to the largest four accounting and audit firms globally, 
namely Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (EY) and KPMG. 
These four firms are also referred to as “large-tier” firms (ICAEW, 2016).  
 The non-big four firms are either mid-tier or small-tier firms depending on their 
respective global size, global presence and capabilities as an audit firm in terms of 
resources (ICAEW, 2016; Rapoport, 2016).  
 
The researcher and the participants in this study used these terms in the interview 
discussions. 
 
The following is a description of the fourteen practitioners interviewed:  
 
 All the partners were considered senior and highly experienced, ranging between 
seven and thirty-three years as a practising audit partner. The average number of 
years as a practising registered auditor of all interviewees is 22 years. 
 Seven of the partners were either a regional or a national managing partner in the 
firm and therefore in key leadership and strategic roles within their respective firms. 
The remainder were senior partners who also held significant leadership 
responsibilities and portfolios within their respective firms or network of firms. 
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 Of the fourteen partners, two were women. 
 The two largest black audit firms in South Africa, namely SizweNtsalubaGobodo Inc. 
and Nkonki Inc. were represented. These two firms are the largest “black-owned” 
audit firms in South Africa and have grown to considerable size to rival the 
traditional “mid-tier” firms. 
 Five partners were from the “big four” international audit firms.  
 The remaining partners were from the “mid-tier” audit firms (including the “black-
owned” medium size firms) who also perform audit services of public interest 
entities. 
 
The below table shows a further description of the audit partners 
(participants/respondents) interviewed, including the number assigned for the purposes of 




Analysis of Results 






Audit Partner 1 Big four Senior partner  25 
Audit Partner 2 Big four Managing Partner 20 
Audit Partner 3 Big four Senior partner  25 
Audit Partner 4 Big four Senior partner  9 
Audit Partner 5 Big four Senior partner  23 
Audit Partner 6 Black-owned Mid-tier Managing Partner 22 
Audit Partner 7 Black-owned Mid-tier Managing Partner 23 
Audit Partner 8 Black-owned Mid-tier Senior partner  29 
Audit Partner 9 Mid-tier Managing Partner 32 
Audit Partner 10 Mid-tier Managing Partner 17 
Audit Partner 11 Mid-tier Senior partner  16 
Audit Partner 12 Mid-tier Managing Partner 33 
Audit Partner 13 Mid-tier Managing Partner 28 
Audit Partner 14 Mid-tier Senior partner  7 
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Interview process and methodology 
Each interview was held in person with the respective participants and lasted between one 
and two hours, the discussion audio being electronically recorded with the express 
permission of each participant. Each participant is held on audio record as giving permission 
to record the interview, on the condition that all personal names, firm names and client 
names mentioned in the discussion will not be made publically available or mentioned in 
any output produced by the researcher for public use.  
 
A standard set of open-ended questions was used to guide the discussion (refer to Appendix 
1). These questions were compiled based on the results of the literature review and the 
interviews of the three key individual experts (refer above). All electronically recorded audio 
data from the interviews was collected and then transcribed after the meeting to be used 
for the data analysis. 
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), qualitative data analysis ideally occurs concurrently 
with data collection so that the researcher can generate an emerging understanding about 
research questions, which in turn informs both the sampling and the questions being asked. 
This was certainly the case within this study as the interviews process was being conducted, 
as new opinions documented fed into and shaped the subsequent discussions with 
interviewees. This iterative process of data collection and analysis eventually leads to a 
point in the data collection where no new categories or themes emerge, referred to as 
saturation, signalling that data collection is complete (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). 
Saturation is believed to have been reached in these interviews in the sense that no new 
themes or categories surrounding the question of MAFR emerged in the last interviews, 
indicating that the sample of fourteen practitioners was sufficient for the purpose of the 
study. 
 
In the analysis of the data from the interviews a grounded theory approach will be 
implemented. Grounded theory is an inductive, theory discovery methodology that allows 
the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while 
simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data (Martin and Turner, 
1986). This is a research methodology which operates almost in a reverse fashion from 
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research in the positivist/empiricist tradition employing an inductive, theory discovery 
methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general 
features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or 
data (Martin & Turner, 1986). Unlike positivist research, a study using grounded theory is 
likely to begin with a question, or set of questions, or even just with the collection of 
qualitative data. As the researcher then reviews the data, repeated ideas, concepts or 
elements become apparent, and are grouped into codes, concepts and categories. These 
categories may become the basis for new theory. 
 
Therefore the analysis of the data from the interviews will be categorised and discussed 
within a framework of the key themes that were either (1) formed based on the open-
ended interview questions themselves, or (2) brought into the discussion by the 
interviewees. The order to which these themes are presented is a reflection of the 
chronological sequence of the discussions as well as the inherent importance of the issue as 
expressed by the interviewees. In order to ensure the reliability (accuracy) of the 
transcribing process the researcher performed a check of the transcription by listening to 
each audio interview with the transcription document in hand.    
 
The transcribed data was then used in order to identify common, recurrent, or emergent 
themes around the issue of MAFR in South Africa. It is also important to analyse patterns 
amongst themes, such as noting similar traits among the partners who express similar 
opinions on issues and themes. For example, the inherent traits of audit firm size is a 
significant categorisation of traits, as well as whether the audit partner represents a black-
owned, mid-tier or large-tier audit firm. A less significant trait may be common experiences 
such as exposure to acting on audit committees or professional bodies.  
 
Regarding the potential for researcher bias, the researcher is in a neutral role as an 
academic with no inherent personal or financial interest in the outcome of legislation in 
South Africa regarding MAFR; hence bias is not a significant risk in the study. The questions 
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The results of the analysis will therefore be a presentation of themes around the partners’ 
views of MAFR and issues related to MAFR. It is important to note that, as mentioned 
above, the purpose of this research is to produce a national field survey, and the open-end 
interview methodology is employed to understand the breadth of the concerns and 
opinions of the audit profession. Therefore, the fourteen partners are not intended to be 
“representative” of the population and there is no need to quantitatively present the 
findings. The purpose is to present the breadth of the issues, not the extent to which the 
population agree or disagree with any particular viewpoint expressed. Quantitative findings 
that can be considered “representative of the population”, namely the South African audit 
profession, will be intention the national field survey study that is intended to follow this 
research (refer to areas for further research).  
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Chapter 4:  Presentation and Analysis of Results 
This section presents and discusses the findings of the study based upon the methodology 
applied to gather information.  
 
The results are presented and analysed according to the following key themes identified by 
the researcher upon review of the complete data collected, being the transcripts that 
document the discussion of the interviews. The order to which these themes are presented 
is a rough reflection of the chronological sequence of the discussions as well as the inherent 
importance of the issues as expressed by the interviewees. 
 
The following significant themes and categories were identified and are used to present the 
analysis of results: 
1. The need for improved auditor independence  
2. Public perception of independence 
3. Competing objectives 
4. The role of the audit committee 
a. The experience, composition and competency of the audit committee 
b. Regulation vs. audit committee judgement 
5. Unintended consequences 
a. Loss of knowledge and experience 
b. The distraction of requiring to source new business 
c. Unmanageable costs 
d. A move away from assurance services 
e. Audit fee low-balling 
6. Possible alternatives to MAFR 
a. Mandatory audit tendering 
b. Combined (joint) audits 
c. Audit manager rotation 
7. Addressing market concentration 
8. Transformation considerations 
9. The problem of over regulation 
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1. The need for improved auditor independence  
 
There was some degree of mixed response with regard to whether or not South African 
auditors were appropriately independent, however most (11/14) were of the opinion that 
independence was not a concern in reality, especially for public interest entities where a 
partner rotation is mandatory every five years. More than half of the audit partners were of 
the opinion that, considering the requirement to rotate the audit partner every five years 
(for public interest audits), MAFR is not likely to bring a further improvement to auditor 
independence.  
 
There were no partners, of the fourteen interviewed, who were fully in favour of MAFR in 
South Africa. Nearly all (13/14) were against it on the grounds that it would not achieve 
improved auditor independence and that there were too many significant negative 
consequences, as will be discussed below. Only one partner was tentatively in favour of 
MAFR but stressed the need to balance the trade-off between (1) gained institutional 
knowledge and experience of the client and (2) the familiarity threat with management that 
develops over time. In this partner’s opinion, if MAFR is required after too short a period 
such as five years, then audit quality will suffer from an auditor lack of knowledge and 
experience with the client. However, too long a period will result in familiarity threats to 
independence, as they believe is a problem currently in practice in South Africa. 
 
After expressing that independence in their experience was not a real concern, i.e. that the 
degree of auditor independence in their audits was sufficient, one audit partner expressed a 
qualification, namely that there will always be the situation whereby the client is the one 
paying the audit fee to the audit firm. This was the case whether or not MAFR was 
implemented and would always result in some degree of conflict of interest. This 
unavoidable threat to independence, i.e. the importance of the client to the auditor, simply 
because the auditor is reliant on the client for the payment of significant audit fees 
(Tepalagul & Lin, 2015), will always provide a degree of risk to auditor independence, and 
realistically cannot be removed so long as the client pays for audit services. The 
international code of ethics also explains that when the total fees from an audit client 
represent a large proportion of the total fees of the firm expressing the audit opinion, the 
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dependence on that client and concern about losing the client creates a self-interest or 
intimidation threat to the auditor’s independence (IFAC, 2006, section 290). However, this 
partner agreed with most of the respondents that independence was not actually a 
significant problem in reality i.e. the threats to auditor independence in practice are 
managed appropriately. (Refer to Quote 1, Appendix 3) 
 
Only one respondent was of the opinion that MAFR would improve independence, stating 
that from a purely theoretical perspective, MAFR would increase independence. However, 
the respondent did not believe that an increase in auditor independence was required in 
practice i.e. they believed that the degree of auditor independence in practice was 
sufficient. (Refer to Quote 2, Appendix 3) 
 
This comment was in the context of smaller companies, as opposed to large listed entities. 
The partner felt that, as a mid-tier firm partner, there are many medium size businesses that 
are considered public interest entities in South Africa but are relatively small private 
companies. These businesses are often family owned and management (who are the 
owners) will often rely on the professional advice of their auditors and over time will 
develop a good relationship with the partners at the audit firm. The partner who expressed 
this also made the point that the public interest score, as it is currently contained in the 
Regulations to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, results in too many smaller businesses being 
labelled as public interest entities. However, this partner’s point was that regulation like 
MAFR would force a greater degree of independence but that would lead to other 
unintended consequences on the profession and on audit quality. Nearly all partners 
interviewed expressed a strong concern that the implementation of MAFR will not improve 
audit quality, even if it may improve auditor independence. The concerns expressed were in 
regard to the unintended consequences and effects of MAFR, as is discussed further below.  
 
All the audit partners expressed concern at the outset of the interviews that forcing MAFR 
on South Africa would result in significant unintended consequences. This will be discussed 
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2. Public perception of independence 
 
Most audit partners (11/14) agreed that there is a significant difference between the public 
perception of independence and the reality of auditor independence, with the public’s 
perception being significantly worse (i.e. perception of an independence or audit quality 
problem) than what was in reality the case (in their opinion). These partners are all in favour 
of pursuing means of addressing public misconceptions about the audit function and about 
auditor independence before making a decision on MAFR. In their opinion the regulator 
(IRBA) should look at means of addressing the perception problem before looking to change 
legislation in the profession. A number of partners illustrated this point with the example of 
how in their experience of discussing their work with company stakeholders and the general 
public, it is not uncommon for people to express their understanding that it is the auditors 
role to guarantee the accuracy of the financial statements and to detect all forms of fraud 
and mismanagement. These experiences are evidence that the public does indeed 
misunderstand the role and value added by the auditor to the credibility of the audited 
financial statements. In the opinion of these partners who expressed these experiences, 
MAFR should not be adopted in response to public perception per se, but instead other 
more effective and perhaps less damaging methods (to audit quality and the profession) 
should be pursued by both the IRBA and the profession to educate public understanding of 
the limitations of the audit function. (Refer to Quotes 3 and 4, Appendix 3) 
 
A number of partners raised the point that there is a high degree of adherence to 
ethical standards at both a professional level and at a firm level, to which the audit 
practitioners need to adhere to. In their opinions they find that the partners take 
this very seriously. In addition, the fact that South African audit partners are 
required by local regulations to place their personal name on the audit report and 
sign, together with the firm name, was raised as a further reason for the partner to 
guard his or her independence. The international audit standards do not require the 
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3. Competing objectives 
 
Some partners, especially the representatives of black-owned emerging audit firms, as well 
as non-big four audit firms, were of the opinion that MAFR or maybe an alternative such as 
combined audits, would improve competition (i.e. reduce market concentration) and 
transformation in the audit industry. In response to this argument other partners pointed 
out that the IRBA needs to be clear as to what exactly any change in regulation is trying to 
achieve. Is the IRBA attempting to improve audit quality or are there other priorities driving 
the agenda, such as market concentration and transformation objectives? More than one 
partner was sceptical that the IRBA claims that MAFR or any alternative to MAFR is primarily 
being considered to improve audit quality in the interest of public protection. In reality they 
believed that there were these alternative objectives around transformation and 
competition being pursued as well. In their opinion there were better ways to achieve the 
other objectives, rather than imposing such significant additional regulation on the industry, 
and that any discussion on MAFR (or an alternative) should only be considered if it did 
indeed improve audit quality. These partners were adamant that by pursuing other 
objectives (in addition to audit quality) in the decision around MAFR could actually result in 
a loss of audit quality. 
 
4. The role of the audit committee 
 
All the audit partners agree that the audit engagement and the choice of the auditor, as well 
as any non-assurance services required, is a decision of both the audit committee, being 
those charged with governance by the shareholders, as well as the auditors themselves. The 
audit committee, whose existence is a legislative requirement in South Africa for a public 
interest entity (refer to section 94 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008), is ultimately 
responsible for the recommendation for the nomination and the replacement of the 
auditor, subject to approval by the shareholders. The decision of whether or not to ask the 
auditors for non-assurance services and whether or not to place the audit out for tender, is 





42 | P a g e  
 
a. The experience, composition and competency of the audit 
committee 
All the partners interviewed agreed with the reasoning that the best means of improving 
auditor independence is actually to improve the quality of corporate governance in the 
audit clients, rather than through MAFR. Improving the quality of the non-executives on the 
audit committees, possibly through education and promotion of King III Report principles of 
corporate governance (soon to be replaced by King IV), was believed to be a means of 
having a greater impact on auditor independence and audit quality. 
 
Some partners had experience as audit committee members, as well as in their capacity as 
audit partners, and they expressed that the Audit Committees that they have served on over 
the years and continue to serve on currently, take auditor independence very seriously. 
Other partners expressed some mixed experiences regarding the experience and 
effectiveness of audit committees. South Africa is very highly rated in terms of its standards 
of corporate governance, namely the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Reports (GCR), including the latest 2015-2016 Report (World Economic Forum, 2015). 
Referring to this fact, many partners stated that, in their experience, often both sides of the 
audit engagement, the auditor and the audit committee, take independence matters very 
seriously. (Refer to Quote 6, Appendix 3)  
 
Providing examples of strong audit committee action, some partners illustrated that, in their 
view, when the opposite is the case, i.e. weak governance by the audit committee, this is 
when there is the greatest potential for independence of the auditor and audit quality to be 
compromised. Weak audit committees resulted in threats to auditor independence and this 
should be acknowledged by the IRBA before regulatory changes such as MAFR impose 
change on the auditors only. 
 
A few audit partners were of the opinion that in their experience there is actually a 
deficiency in the functioning of the audit committee and this deficiency needs to be 
addressed before MAFR, or any other audit regulation, is considered. An interesting 
dissenting view came from a mid-tier firm partner who expressed the occasional failure of 
audit committees, although the person was in favour of strengthening corporate 
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governance as a better approach than MAFR. In their experience there is a tendency 
sometimes for audit committees, and audit committee chairpersons, to firstly favour certain 
audit firms or secondly, not consider the need to replace auditors periodically to remove the 
familiarity threats. (Refer to Quote 10, Appendix 3) 
 
One partner, with extensive experience as both an audit committee member and 
chairperson, as well as auditor, expressed a concern that in their experience the audit 
committee’s independence from management can negatively affect their quality as a 
committee, especially as it related to managing external audit as required by the codes of 
corporate governance and the Companies Act. Too often management is handling issues 
that are clearly the mandate of the audit committee and the audit committee acts as the 
“rubber stamp”, simply ratifying management’s decision in these issues. (Refer to Quote 11, 
Appendix 3) 
 
Referring to certain key issues that are the responsibility of the audit committee to manage, 
this partner made the point that sometimes key issues that should be the jurisdiction of the 
audit committee were dealt with by management and decided upon, before reaching the 
audit committee. A number of respondents expressed this concern around management 
involving themselves in audit committee matters. As it pertains to auditor independence, 
the problem expressed was that the audit committee receives the result of management 
decisions regarding key audit issues, such as an audit misstatement uncovered by the 
auditor, issues around terms of the appointment of the auditor, or non-assurance services 
to be provided by the auditor. The decision making should however happen the other way 
around i.e. the audit committee consults with the auditor, makes the relevant decisions, and 
then notifies management. In this partner’s view, sometimes the audit committee is even 
guilty of actively requiring the auditor to settle a key issue with management, rather than 
being the key player in the decision. The specific example given was the audit committee 
requiring management to approve the audit fee and if they had done so, the committee 
would simply “rubber stamp” the agreement. Any debate around the audit fee becomes one 
that is between auditor and client management, with the audit committee willingly sitting 
on the side-line, in direct contravention to corporate governance codes of best practice. 
(Refer to Quotes 12 and 13, Appendix 3) 
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The respondents often provided examples from past experience, such as one partner 
describing a situation whereby he/she was a member of an audit committee and 
management simply told them that the audit was going out for tender. Management then 
went so far as to provide the audit committee with the short list of firms that had tendered 
for the role. If this reality presents itself in a company, and if it is tolerated by the audit 
committee, the result is clearly an ineffective audit committee and poor corporate 
governance practice. In addition, as this partner points out, if this is the way decisions are 
made in the company regarding the audit function, the auditors now need to manage their 
relationship with management. Managing the relationship with management and thereby 
impairing auditor independence is seen as a necessary means to retain the audit work, since 
management are effectively performing the role of the audit committee and the non-
executives. Therefore this relationship with management creates a clear conflict of interest 
for the auditor and impairs their independence. It was expressed that if management do not 
like the auditors or feel that they are too expensive or raising too many audit adjustments, 
then management can either put the audit out for tender. And this reality is the case 
regardless of whether there is audit partner or audit firm rotation. The problem exists in 
both legislated environments, whether there is MAFR or not. Either way there is a lack of 
independence that will reduce audit quality significantly. It was expressed that this is the 
problem that the regulator (IRBA) should be looking to address, and MAFR is not the 
solution. Rather, in the opinion of some of the partners, measures to educate non-
executives, and strengthen the corporate governance, will have the greatest impact on 
auditor independence. Another suggested solution to this was better informed and more 
active shareholders who ensure the independence of the audit committee board members 
(non-executives) and who appoint auditors based on this independent recommendation 
from the audit committee, as is the intention of the Companies Act and the King III Report 
on governance. 
 
Many respondents expressed similar concerns of a lack of professionalism, knowledge of 
role and independence in the operations of the audit committee. The partners had 
experienced many strong and independent audit committees, but unfortunately the “rubber 
stamp” system is a problem in more than a few companies. (Refer to Quote 14, Appendix 3)  
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Some of the audit partners expressed the opinion that the weakness in corporate 
governance lies not in its principles, as South Africa has some of the best governance 
principles and structures in the world. All the partners were well aware of the findings of the 
Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) in this regard. Rather, the problem lies in its 
execution in some companies, and of most concern was the need to strengthen the role of 
the non-executive director. The quality of the non-executive directors needed to be 
improved in the opinion of many respondents, especially their understanding of King III 
corporate governance principles, and their degree of independence from the company. 
(Refer to Quote 7, Appendix 3) 
 
There was a generally expressed concern around the quality and independence of company 
non-executive directors was specifically identified by other partners. In South Africa, and 
certainly on exchange listed companies, it is the non-executive directors who comprise the 
audit committees. Frustration was expressed that the reality of their experience is that non-
executive directors are sometimes not being appointed because the shareholders really 
believe that they should be, or that the audit committee really believes that they are the 
right firm for the job. The appointment is made because the CEO and CFO believe they 
should be, and this in their opinion is a major problem in South Africa and likely globally. 
This is a problem that they believe is not being acknowledged and needs to be addressed. 
(Refer to Quote 15, Appendix 3) 
 
Whereas all the audit partners interviewed were of the opinion that auditor independence 
can better be established and strengthened through proper corporate governance at the 
audit client, this should not be construed as though they believe that corporate governance 
practices in South Africa are weak. On the contrary, a number of audit partners (as above) 
referred to the GCRs issued every year by the World Economic Forum which rate South 
Africa’s “strength of auditing and reporting standards” 1st out of 140 countries researched, 
the “efficacy of corporate boards” 3rd and “strength of investor protection” 14th, based on 
the 2016 Report (World Economic Forum, 2015). Together with the general recognition that 
the South African King III Report on Corporate Governance is one on the best governance 
codes available, it was the opinion of many that the discussion around MAFR should take 
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into account that South Africa is in a strong position from a governance and auditing 
standards perspective, relative to other developed and developing countries. One partner 
made the point that, considering the strength of South Africa’s corporate governance and 
auditing standards, as externally verified, they seriously question the assumption that MAFR 
would actually improve audit quality. The IRBA needs to answer this question: Will it really 
improve audit quality? If it cannot be convincingly shown to improve audit quality then it 
should not be pursued. (Refer to Quote 8, Appendix 3) 
 
b. Regulation vs. audit committee judgement 
A common concern raised was that MAFR would have the effect of removing the need for 
much important discussion and decision-making by the audit committees and therefore take 
away their role as the ultimate “auditor gatekeeper” and assessor of the audit function 
within the company. Currently the audit committee must, in terms of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, approve non-assurance services required of the auditor and formally assess the 
independence and suitability of the auditor to the company. The feeling was that MAFR 
would take this important judgement and control away from the audit committee and 
replace it with simple rotation regulation. The audit committee would no longer have the 
incentive to take auditor independence and auditor suitability (to the company) seriously. 
The audit committee would no longer apply its collective mind to the issue of auditor 
independence, certainly not to the degree expected in terms of corporate governance 
principles outlined in the King III Report, because it would be believed that the issue was 
dealt with by regulation, not by the audit committee. Why should the committee concern 
itself with threats to auditor independence, especially in light of non-assurance services and 
familiarity through relationships with management, when the firm would be replaced as a 
matter of legislation in due course? It was felt (by many partners) that mandatory rotation 
would artificially limit the freedom of those charged with governance to appoint the audit 
firm which best meets the needs of the company and its stakeholders. (Refer to Quote 9, 
Appendix 3) 
 
These views by the partners interviewed reflect a common international argument against 
MAFR in that auditor rotation would now be arbitrarily forced on a company, regardless of 
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the stage or set of specific circumstances that the company finds itself in. For example, just 
when a company needs the experience of its long standing auditors, for example in merger 
or acquisition deals, or in an operational change of direction, which would present 
significant audit risks, this may coincide with the need to rotate the audit firm, with the 
incoming audit firm at a significant disadvantage due to unfamiliarity of the client.   
 
5. Unintended consequences 
 
All the audit partners without exception stressed significant negative consequences from 
the pursuit of MAFR, many going so far as to conclude that MAFR will ultimately therefore 
reduce audit quality. Of most concern was (1) the loss of valuable client-specific and 
industry-specific knowledge in the rotation, as well as (2) the unmanageable and 
unnecessary costs that MAFR would cause the audit firms to incur. 
 
a. Loss of knowledge and experience 
A primary negative consequence of MAFR that was raised was the significant loss of client 
specific knowledge that would leave with the outgoing audit firm upon firm rotation. At the 
heart of that client and industry knowledge is an understanding of the audit risks at the 
client. It was the view that the auditor who has a better understanding of the audit risks, will 
ultimately produce the best audit quality in the end product, which is the audited financial 
statements and the audit report, not to mention the value-added report provided to 
management together with the audit itself. One partner made the point by stating that the 
loss of a client to a firm will decrease audit quality because it has the effect of “promoting 
incompetence”. (Refer to Quotes 16, 17 and 18, Appendix 3) 
 
Many partners were concerned that the “new broom sweeps clean”, “fresh eyes” argument 
in favour of MAFR does not justify the loss of institutional knowledge from the outgoing 
audit firm. The incoming auditor will take a significant amount of time to familiarise 
themselves with the client’s business and understand the audit risks appropriately. (Refer to 
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One partner, who was experienced in the audit of large listed organisations, and who has 
recently experienced moving from one large complex client to another under the rule of 
normal audit partner rotation, even just within the same industry, expressed their concern 
around the complexity of some of the large listed groups and the fact that it takes many 
years to gain the required experience to properly act as the audit partner. In reality, what 
happens with five year audit partner rotation is that the replacement audit partner within 
the firm will start “shadowing the old partner”. This allows the new partner to learn the 
industry and understand the audit and financial reporting risks in the complex entity. In time 
he/she will take over as the engagement partner (i.e. the person who signs the auditor’s 
final report concerning the annual financial statements) and this produces an appropriate 
system of training and continuity, preserving the significant institutional knowledge gained 
by the audit firm over time. The opinion was that this continuity and deep understanding of 
the complex client is lost in a system of MAFR. (Refer to Quote 20, Appendix 3) 
 
The above opinion was also expressed by a mid-tier audit firm partner who made the point 
that the larger and more complex the company under consideration, the more audit risk the 
incoming auditor will be exposed to due to unfamiliarity of the operations and risks of 
material misstatement. In the respondent’s opinion, MAFR will produce “a team that has 
zero knowledge, nor the partner, nor do the manager, nor any of the staff have any 
knowledge of that client”. (Refer to Quote 21, Appendix 3) 
 
b. The distraction of having to source new business 
One partner in particular had an interesting opinion regarding the business case during the 
transition between outgoing and incoming audit firms under a regime of MAFR. As the 
outgoing auditor nears the end of the firm’s term in a system of MAFR, the firm needs to 
replace that income stream that is about to be lost. There are staff salaries that need to be 
paid, plus other expenses. The audit partners are ultimately responsible for sourcing new 
work in an audit firm and will be under significant pressure to source new audit work to 
replace the clients that need to be rotated, or to turn the audit client into an advisory, non-
assurance client. Apart from the fact that this creates a clear conflict of interest to auditor 
independence, this will require significant planning, tendering, and meeting with 
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prospective audit committees to make presentations, studying potential audit clients to 
perform proper pre-engagement activities, etc. This increased stress, time and cost will take 
its toll on audit quality on the outgoing client audits in their last year or two of the rotation 
term. (Refer to Quote 22, Appendix 3) 
 
The business case impact of MAFR was expressed by a number of partners as being a very 
important consideration. The above opinion expresses the concern that an amount of 
unprofessionalism, conflict of interest and distraction may impact the audit when the firm 
knows it will need to source new work to replace the coming lost income from the 
assurance work. The firm will need to consider setting itself up to perform advisory services 
to the audit client and this priority will be seen as a business necessity to remain profitable. 
The problem then will be a self-interest threat to the independence of that auditor, or 
simply a distracted lack of attention, and perhaps they will be less likely to raise audit 
adjustments or report modifications and reportable irregularities in the last couple of years 
on the engagement. This will threaten audit quality. It is important to note that this is not 
necessarily the case with the current system of audit partner rotation every five years as the 
firm retains the business in the rotation. 
 
c. Unmanageable costs 
Many of the audit partners expressed significant concern regarding the degree of tendering 
and costs involved that MAFR will introduce to the market. The typical argument was that 
MAFR will result in many more audits going out for tender, albeit tenders whereby the 
incumbent auditor will not be allow to bid for reappointment. The other firms will need to 
tender for the work as they also have to deal with the fact that MAFR will require them to 
give up audit clients. So the effect will be the need to produce many more tender 
documents, together with the extensive research, pre-engagement activities and 
presentations that necessarily come with tendering for audit work. The cost was considered 
by many to be unmanageable and hugely time consuming. In the opinion of one mid-tier 
audit partner, the expected effect on their firm will be the need to consider developing an 
entire department to dedicate their resources to producing tenders and presentations to 
audit committees. This person also felt that, as a mid-tier firm, these tender proposals to 
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the larger companies would simply be turned down because of the perception by 
stakeholders and audit committees that non-big four audit firms cannot or perhaps should 
not be auditing large listed companies. As documented under the market concentration 
section, many are in agreement that MAFR will simply result in a rotation of the large 
company audits amongst the big four firms.  
 
Another area of cost increase will be the pressure on the auditors to increase the audit fees, 
thereby increasing the cost to the companies. This seems to be a counter effect to the low-
balling effect that many partners raised (refer below). An auditor should base their audit fee 
on factors such as the degree of work required in the form of staff time, staff seniority 
required on the audit team, specialist skills needed, size of the client’s operations and 
degree of audit risk involved, as guided by accepted practice, the auditing standards and 
ethical codes. Then surely the incoming audit firm, who because of their unfamiliarity with 
the client, who will therefore need to spend much more time understanding the business 
and its high risk areas, understanding systems descriptions, training staff etc., will need to 
charge a higher fee? (Refer to Quote 23, Appendix 3) 
 
An opinion expressed in this regard was that this unfamiliarity cost is more significant the 
larger and the more complex the client is. The more complex and diverse the entity’s 
operations are, as is the case with large listed companies, the greater the degree of audit 
risk and audit complexity. Audit risk refers to the likelihood of there being a material 
financial misstatement, or area of financial fraud, impacting the fair presentation of the 
financial statements of that company. In addition, if the company is in an industry with 
which the audit firm is less familiar or less experienced, then again the unfamiliarity costs 
are again higher, and surely this should be reflected in the audit fees? If the audit fee is 
sticky upwards, due to the audit committee and management’s reluctance to increase fees 
simply because MAFR was implemented into legislation, the cost of MAFR will be borne by 
the audit firms. Most of the partners were already of the opinion that the profits and 
remuneration to be had in the audit firm were not commensurate of the risk and work 
required (refer to discussion below), so this further added cost layer causing a margin 
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d. A move away from assurance services 
A concerning trend expressed by some of the audit partners, especially those who are not 
from big four audit practices, is the move of small-tier firms away from audit to focus on 
accounting and tax advisory work. In these partner’s experience, smaller firms are unable to 
reasonably compete with the mid- and large-tier firms in offering of assurance services and 
therefore cease to provide audit services. What were identified as the reasons for this? 
Mostly it was the regulatory burden and risk-reward imbalance that is believed to be in the 
offering of audit services, but also the dominance of the larger firms, especially considering 
that only the larger companies require statutory audits in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (i.e. the public interest entities). Concern was expressed by these respondents that 
this trend is not good for the profession and for promoting competition in the industry. If 
MAFR was introduced, depending on which category of companies it was aimed at, it may 
cause the smaller firms to further question whether they should be offering assurance 
services. In the opinion of the partners who expressed this, the regulator (IRBA) should 
consider these smaller firms and the possible impact that MAFR could have on their 
businesses.  
 
e. Audit fee low-balling 
The problem of low-balling, which is the offering of an unrealistically low fee so as to obtain 
the business, was also raised by many partners. In a system of MAFR there could be a 
situation whereby, as more firms have to tender for the work as rotation is imposed, audit 
fees will become a significant determining factor in the eyes of the audit committees, 
management and the audit firms themselves. This can produce low-balling, which is the 
under bidding of the competition simply to win the audit engagement, to the degree that 
the audit fee is too low to perform the audit with appropriate quality, resources and in 
compliance with the professional auditing standards. Again there is the link being brought 
up by the interviewed partners between MAFR and a reduction in audit quality. The 
international ethics code also prohibits this activity and explains that unduly low fees 
creates a sel-interest threat to the auditor’s professional competence and due care if it is so 
low that it may be difficult to perform the engagement in accordance with applicable 
technical and professional standards for that price (IFAC, 2006, section 240). 
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A mid-tier audit firm partner expressed the opinion with regard to low-balling audit fees, 
especially in light of MAFR, that it will produce an environment where much more tendering 
will need to take place. The concern was directed in particular at the non-big four firms, 
which the partner believed were more likely to low-ball as smaller firms have more to lose 
by not securing the audit work on a tender. It is interesting to note that this partner was not 
from a big four audit firm and yet he/she admitted that it is the non-big four firms that have 
the incentive to low ball as they are heavily reliant on their client in terms of proportion of 
total revenue. If MAFR was to be implemented without proper regulation and policing of the 
audit fee, there would be a problem of low balling audit fees without a doubt. (Refer to 
Quote 24, Appendix 3) 
 
A suggestion was that if the IRBA moves the regulation to one of MAFR or even joint audits, 
a fees system could be implemented, as is similar with attorney’s fees, where guidance is 
provided by the regulator, as well as a system for dispute regulation on fees. This may help 
prevent low balling. (Refer to Quote 25, Appendix 3)  
 
6. Possible alternatives to MAFR 
 
In the discussion with the audit partners around possible alternatives to MAFR the 
responses were partly determined by the degree to which the partner felt that auditor 
independence or audit quality was a problem in South Africa. As has been noted already 
most (11/14) were of the opinion that auditor independence was not a legitimate concern in 
reality, and therefore they felt that there was really no need to seek an alternative to MAFR 
or significantly change the current system of principles and regulations. However, despite 
strong feelings against the need to change the current legislative environment with respect 





53 | P a g e  
 
a. Mandatory audit tendering 
The partners that commented on this felt that legislating a system of requiring the audit to 
be placed for tender after prescribed periods would be preferable to MAFR. Mandatory 
tendering was felt to be preferable as it would allow the incumbent auditor to compete 
through tender for the client again, as opposed to MAFR which would exclude the 
incumbent for being reappointed. However, the fact that the audit committee or the 
shareholders are currently able to place the audit out for tender in any given year was felt 
by some to negate the need to impose the requirement through legislation. As mentioned 
already, the legislating of tendering or MAFR removes the need, or at least the incentive, for 
the audit committee (or shareholders) to apply their collective mind as to whether the 
incumbent auditor is well-suited and independent to the company, or whether it is the right 
time in the life cycle of the business to seek new auditors. This is because mandatory 
tendering and MAFR is a matter of regulation imposed on the audit committee, not a matter 
of professional judgement. 
 
b. Combined (joint) audits 
There was considerable mixed opinion as to whether joint audits were a viable alternative 
to MAFR. The partners from the black-owned emerging audit firms were in favour of 
combined audits, pointing out that combined audits which they had been involved with in 
the past had significantly grown their firm’s skills and capacity to perform such assurance 
services to large public interest entities. This was an important point for them, being that 
joint audits which involved a more experienced firm and a smaller, less established firm (like 
the black-owned emerging firms), or even normal mid-tier firms, would allow a significant 
skills transfer and opportunity to build the necessary resources to provide large companies, 
such as JSE listed companies, with assurance services. Joint audits could provide the much 
needed skills transfer to smaller firms that MAFR could not. This opinion was also strongly 
expressed by one mid-tier audit firm partner (Audit Partner 9) who pointed to the success 
that combined audits has brought to market concentration in France. France is a country 
that has applied a system of combined audits for a number of years and in the opinion of 
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In the French example given by this partner, if you go back about 20-25 years in France 
there were three local French firms competing with the big audit firms at that time. What 
would then happen in the joint audit system was that one big audit firm would partner with 
the local French firm. Over time that allowed one local French firm to grow to the 
international practice that it is today, currently auditing 13 of the top 40 listed companies 
(the CAC 40) on the Euronext Paris exchange. In the opinion of this partner, joint audits 
allowed the firm to grow to a size in which it would never have reached in a jurisdiction such 
as the United Kingdom (UK). In the UK, of the top 100 companies on the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index, all are audited by big four firms, with only one exception. 
This partner goes on to explain that in their view the resistance around the world to 
combined audits is often because it will challenge the dominance of the big four firms. What 
has already happened is that the big firms have reduced from five or six over the years to 
four and this is not good in their opinion for the profession and public interest. (Refer to 
Quote 26, Appendix 3) 
 
The partners in favour of combined audit arrangements point out the problem that smaller 
firms have from a business perspective. From a business perspective the audit firm 
leadership cannot justify taking on more staff resources to audit larger companies until they 
are actually appointed as the auditor or else they risk going out of business from a profit 
point of view. But without the resources the audit firm cannot justify tendering for the work 
to secure the audit. (Refer to Quote 27, Appendix 3) 
 
An audit partner who favoured the joint auditors approach suggested that perhaps the IRBA 
should consider phasing in MAFR by first implementing a system of combined audits for 
large public interest companies, which would allow the mid-tier audit firms to up-skill and 
build their resources to be able to properly compete and produce good quality audits in a 
later system of MAFR without combined audits. This partner made an illustration with the 
South African mining industry where they pointed out that maybe only three audit firms 
have the ability to audit the large mining companies. Perhaps joint audit would allow more 
firms the opportunity to service this industry because as it stands now, no responsible audit 
committee is going to appoint or recommend for appointment any firm other than those 
three firms who have the mining audit experience.  
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However, again the question is posed from other partners, which is relevant to the debate: 
Why exactly is South Africa considering changes to the regulations? Is it really because of 
independence and audit quality concerns, or is it to achieve other objectives such as 
increased competition and transformation? In their opinion it is important for the regulator 
(IRBA) to be transparent about the true priorities and intentions, as changes to regulations 
may have the unintended consequence of actually reducing audit quality. 
 
There were serious concerns expressed by some against joint audits. All the big four 
partners were against a system of joint audits, while most non-big four partners were in 
favour on the grounds that it would allow their firms to grow to compete with the big four. 
The main concern expressed by the big four partners was the unnecessary cost and 
duplication of work required in such a system. This was expressed by one partner in 
particular who had some experience with joint audits, as joint audits is currently a 
requirement in the banking industry and used to be applicable in the insurance industry in 
South Africa. Based on approximately ten years’ experience with joint audits, this partner 
has found joint audit engagements to be costly and ineffective. The main reasons provided 
for this were that there is much unnecessary overlap and duplication of work, with two 
audit partners, two managers, two teams, all billing time and often covering the same 
ground twice rather than effectively coordinating work and trusting each team to get their 
respective sections audited. In their opinion joint audits would not contribute towards 
increased independence, would not be feasible from a cost perspective and would not be 
practical. (Refer to Quote 28, Appendix 3) 
 
One of the partners, who is from an emerging black-owned audit firm, and who has 
experienced joint audits in public sector audits, raised the concern that joint audits 
(unfortunately in their opinion) work better when they are between two equal firms, such 
as two big four firms or two mid-tier firms. The problem they have experienced in their 
practice is when the management or the audit committee perceives the joint audit as an 
“unequal partnership” in the sense that one of the firms is the smaller mid-tier or black-
owned firm and the other is the more established big four firm. The problem with this is 
that the opinion of the big four firm usually holds sway, and this is more so the case in the 
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eyes of the audit committee. So whereas joint audits in this partner’s opinion will allow the 
smaller firm to grow and up-skill, it may not improve independence due to this perception 
of unequal partners and the smaller firm’s voice and opinion on the audit findings or audit 
direction may not be given equal importance. 
 
It is significant to note that both the managing partners from the emerging black-owned 
firms, whose practices have significant experience with joint audits in state-owned 
companies, agree that joint audits have allowed their firms and staff to up-skill and grow to 
the point where they could act as sole auditor on the state-owned companies. This has 
allowed these smaller black-owned South African firms to grow into mid-tier size firms, 
improving competition and also black economic transformation in the profession.  
Responding to the common argument of increased cost and duplication of work, one of the 
managing partners from the emerging black-owned firms expressed the opinion that it can 
work and is “a brilliant opportunity to achieve two-in-one”, namely increased independence 
and transformation. Duplication of work is simply a management problem that can be 
overcome. (Refer to Quote 29, Appendix 3) 
 
c. Audit manager rotation 
Nearly all the audit partners agreed that rotation of audit team members in addition to the 
audit partner would not be a viable alternative, simply because the article clerks (trainees) 
on the audit team have a short rotation period inherently as they serve their three year 
training contract and generally leave the audit firm or move on to other roles with in the 
firm. It was also felt that even the management layer on the audit team experiences a 
sufficient degree of natural rotation as audit managers are promoted in the firm, move to 
other areas in the firm or leave the firm for alternative job opportunities. Therefore audit 
manager or audit team rotation would not improve independence of the auditor. The 
current system of partner rotation was agreed by all partners interviewed to be a system 
that does indeed mitigate the familiarity threat that can develop due to long standing 
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7. Addressing market concentration 
 
Market concentration is a function of the number of firms and their respective shares of the 
total capacity in a market. All the audit partners expressed concern, despite their other 
differing opinions on other related matters, that a significant unintended consequence of 
forcing MAFR on South Africa would be the likelihood that the audit of large companies 
(particularly the listed companies) would simply rotate around the big four audit firms and 
therefore actually reduce competition rather than grow it. As mentioned, none of the 
partners are fully in favour of MAFR, most are against it, but some are of the opinion that a 
slower, more structured implementation of MAFR (perhaps via a system of mandating joint 
audits), could allow non-big four audit firms to grow in skills and resources to allow them to 
compete in time for larger company audits in a system of MAFR. However, these partners 
were more in favour of a simple joint audits regulation as opposed to MAFR. There was 
significant disagreement as to whether market concentration was a concern. As could 
maybe be expected, none of the big four partners believed that market concentration was a 
problem or that it was the regulator’s (IRBA) place to step in to actively address it. 
Comparisons were made to other industries such as banking, telecommunications and 
construction, whereby similar concentrations of companies are present and therefore the 
audit industry should not be seen as much different. In addition, the market concentration 
of the South African audit industry is comparable to that in other countries.  
 
Of the partners who agreed that market concentration was a problem, all were in favour of 
joint audits rather than MAFR as a means to improve competition. It is fair to say, and a 
significant observation, that there was no person interviewed who was in favour of a direct 
move from the current system to one of MAFR, either to improve independence or to 
improve competition in the audit industry. 
 
In response to being asked whether MAFR will allow mid-tier to compete for the larger 
company (public interest entity) audits, one big four partner described the situation as a 
“shifting of the deck chairs” around the big four. The key question they raised was whether 
the audit committee would be prepared to appoint a firm that clearly did not have the past 
experience or resources for the large listed company audit engagement? In their opinion the 
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audit committee would not take the risk of such an appointment as they expect a 
substantial degree of experience, resources and industry knowledge that the mid-tier firms 
did not possess. The audit committee expects a large audit firm to be present in every 
location that their business is located internationally and to draw on such geographically 
spread resources in order to perform the audit. These respondents did not believe that the 
smaller firms could provide this required service as auditors that the big four firms could 
and hence would not be appointed after the tender process. The problem will be that the 
smaller firms will tender for the audits in a system of MAFR, but will not be appointed due 
to the above concerns of the audit committee. (Refer to Quote 30, Appendix 3) 
 
Referring to the larger listed multi-national companies, one partner made the point that in 
their opinion, having been involved in a few companies of this size and geographic diversity, 
the mid-tier firms could not possibly perform assurance services on that scale. In that sense 
MAFR would actually reduce competition as these audits would have to move from the one 
big four firm to one of the other three. (Refer to Quote 31, Appendix 3) 
 
This opinion is also shared by some mid-tier audit partners. The concern is simply that the 
audit committee, when faced with having to choose another audit firm during a mandatory 
rotation is likely to stay with a big four firm, rather than risk negative stakeholder 
perception by moving away from the big four. (Refer to Quotes 32 and 33, Appendix 3) 
 
Considering the risk involved and the experience, skills and size of mid-tier firms, why would 
the audit committees of large companies award the audit to a non-big four firm? This was a 
common question raised by audit partners, of both large and mid-tier firms. Audit 
committees of larger companies would be less inclined in their opinion, for reasons of 
perceived risk or quality or resources, to award tenders to non-big four firms, regardless of 
whether MAFR was introduced.  
 
One partner expressed, regarding large listed companies in particular, that the current 
system of five year partner rotation, together with the audit committee and shareholders 
having the power to put the audit out for tender, allows all four big four audit firms (or all 
firms for that matter) to bid for appointment – including the incumbent big four firm. 
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However, the effect of MAFR would change this significantly. Under MAFR regulations the 
audit committee and shareholders will be required to rotate the incumbent big four firm, 
but the incumbent will not be allowed to bid for the tender i.e. to bid for reappointment. 
Therefore, since the audit committee will likely only favour another big four firm (as it is a 
listed company), this results in only three possible choices for auditor - as opposed to four in 
the current system. So the thinking is that MAFR in effect will actually reduce competition in 
practice. Can the audit committee of a large listed company realistically be expected to 
award the tender to a non-big four audit firm, considering stakeholder perceptions and the 
size and experience of the mid-tier firms? The majority of the audit partners interviewed 
agreed with this reasoning as far as it applied to large listed entities. This effect will 
therefore be to reduce market competition in the audit industry. 
 
Another argument that MAFR would actually reduce competition was expressed by mid-tier 
audit partners, with the point that the smaller firms do not currently have the skills, 
experience or resources to service the large complex companies. Many of the big four 
partners made this point as well. And how could the leadership of the audit firm gear up to 
responsibly perform such audits if firstly they may not be awarded the tender and secondly 
they will only have the client for the rotation period, whatever period that may be legislated 
under MAFR? (Refer to Quote 34, Appendix 3) 
 
Due to the problem that the incoming audit firms will need to urgently procure the skills and 
experience to perform the audit professionally, the firm will be tempted to offer the staff 
from the outgoing audit firm jobs on their audit team. This was referred to by the partner as 
“cheating the system” of MAFR. (Refer to Quote 35, Appendix 3) 
 
An example of this was then given with the internal audit function of a large South African 
state-owned entity that outsourced this function to one of the big four audit firms. What 
happened according to the respondent was that the audit firm then employed most of the 
state-owned entity’s internal audit staff, with the effect that they left the company to work 
for the audit firm but to perform the same services as the internal audit function. Based on 
this example, the respondent expressed the view that MAFR would have a similar effect, i.e. 
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staff will move from one employer to the other yet work on the same audit client. This 
possibility was also expressed by other partners. (Refer to Quotes 36 and 37, Appendix 3) 
 
Will MAFR rotation result in this kind of “headhunting” and employment relocation? If so, 
the will it occur to such a degree as to negate the added independence that MAFR is 
intended to produce. The partners who expressed this concern made the point that it would 
be an economic necessity and make good strategic sense to source the staff who were 
involved in the audit before the rotation. In their opinion this has already been happening, 
albeit in a very limited capacity, under the current partner rotation scheme. MAFR would 
perhaps incentivise the firms to do it on a larger scale. 
 
8. Transformation considerations 
 
All the partners interviewed who were not members of the black emerging audit firms 
(11/14) expressed serious concern regarding whether the black firms who have been 
awarded large public tenders have the resources, skills and experience to audit such large 
public interest entities. The concern was that if a firm is under resourced for the job, or has 
no prior experience with a specific industry, then a drop in the quality of the audit process 
and audit outcome is inevitable. Government, in their opinion, has been far too quick to 
award such large tenders to the black-owned audit firms and should have either sought joint 
audit arrangements for longer or promoted the ability of existing audit firms to transform 
from within as a better method of achieving transformation objectives. This concern 
expressed is very similar to that which all the mid- and large-tier firm partners expressed 
regarding the upskilling required of non-big four firms before they are sufficiently capable to 
service the large listed companies. Therefore the opinion expressed was that MAFR poses a 
significant risk to audit quality if a smaller audit firm, whether black-owned or not, is placed 
in a position too soon to audit a large company or group of companies. Again we see the 
possibility of MAFR to either result in reduced audit quality if this situation occurs or simply 
result in the audit committees not awarding the audit to smaller (non-big four) firms and 
MAFR causing reduced competition as the large company audits rotate around the big four 
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So what were the opinions of the black-owned firm audit partners about their ability to 
service larger and more complex companies? When asked whether non-big four audit firms, 
including the black-owned firms, had the skills and resources to handle the larger and more 
complex company audits, the managing director of a black-owned firm responded that 
there is a problem with perception rather than with reality. In their opinion the mid-tier 
firms can audit the larger entities and it is wrong to simply assume that they don’t have the 
skills or resources because they are not big four firms. This partner expressed how difficult it 
was for them to just be appointed as a service provider to large companies for non-
assurance work, because there is such a strong perception that their firm lacks the skills and 
resources. However, they believed that the perceptions are slowly changing as they prove 
themselves in the non-assurance work and in joint audit arrangements. This opinion by a 
black-owned audit firm partner is in contrast to the big four partner and some mid-tier 
partner opinions, which hold that the smaller firms cannot yet audit the bigger listed 
entities, many of which are multi-national companies. 
 
Again the concerns expressed in this regard contrasted the differing objectives of improving 
audit quality so as to achieve sufficient public protection on the one hand, and achieving 
black economic empowerment (transformation) in the profession. If regulation changes are 
pursued with too many objectives in mind, or with too little research and stakeholder 
consultation, then the unintended consequence of a loss of audit quality may result. As 
many partners pointed out, surely public protection through enhanced audit quality should 
be the only reason for changing reason in favour of MAFR? And if so, most, if not all 
partners interviewed, believed that MAFR was not going to achieve improved audit quality. 
 
Of particular interest was the fact that all the non-big four partners were of the opinion that 
market concentration of the public interest company audits was a problem in South Africa 
and needed to be addressed for the good of the profession and the public. Many admitted 
that this was not a South African specific problem by any means, however South Africa was 
in a unique position whereby transformation was also a high priority in business, across all 
industries in the economy. By addressing market concentration appropriately in the 
profession through whatever means was considered most appropriate, it would also 
thereby improve transformation, as it would allow the smaller black-owned emerging firms 
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to compete in the private sector, together with the other non-big four firms. The big 
question that was raised numerous times was the question of whether MAFR was the best 
means to achieve this transformation. None of the partners, including those from black-
owned firms believed it was the best means. As mentioned already, there was one black-
owned partner, who was tentatively in favour of MAFR, but only if significant corporate 
governance weaknesses were addressed first and it was pursued carefully and in a slow 
staged process, such as via a period of requiring joint audits, to allow the non-big four firms 
time to gain experience with the larger more complex companies. 
 
A common concern from the mid-tier firms, referred to by one partner as a “chicken before 
the egg story”, was the constraint around gearing up your audit firm to service large 
companies. This improved capacity in the mid-tier is one of the IRBA’s clear 
intentions for MAFR i.e. improve competition in the audit sector, including the 
ability of black-owned firms to compete, which promotes transformation as well. 
However, how do mid-tier and black-owned firms upskill and increase their 
resources so as to responsibly and professionally provide audit services to large 
private companies? How do they afford to do so without first being appointed as 
auditors? How, from a pure business perspective, can they justify the cost and the 
risk of increasing staff and other resources on the hope that their firm will be 
appointed as the auditor? This was seen as a significant restraint to MAFR achieving 
improved competition and transformation. One partner from a mid-tier firm 
expressed the concern that simply increasing staff numbers in expectation of MAFR 
and in expectation of receiving more appointments (referring to mid-tier and black-
owned firms), is dangerous as you need the right skills and the right experience, not 
simply the numbers and the technology. Or else the sacrifice will be reduced audit 
quality. A number of partners expressed that this is perhaps what has already 
occurred by the appointment of the emerging black-owned audit firms to the large 
public sector and state-owned enterprise audits. Do they (or did they when first 
appointed) have sufficient skill, experience and resources for such large, high audit 
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Some partners suggested that either promoting transformation within the existing 
firms or allowing mergers with the black-owned firms was preferable to MAFR in 
promoting transformation. One partner who was not from one of the emerging 
black-owned audit firms acknowledged that although many consider mergers of 
these audit firms with the “more established firms” as a solution to promoting 
transformation in the audit profession, it may not be wise, as the corporate cultures 
and management styles may not necessarily integrate well. (Refer to Quote 38, 
Appendix 3) 
 
This person went on to state that therefore joint audits may be a better solution than 
pursuing MAFR or a simple mergers of firms. Joint audits better allow for a mentoring 
process and skills transfer to emerging black firms, while preserving their autonomy and 
growth as a separate firm in the market. 
 
Perhaps in disagreement over the regulator’s (IRBA) thinking around transformation 
through growth of the emerging black-owned firms, the big four audit partners were quick 
to point out that their firms, and others, were transforming and this should be recognised 
by the regulator. One managing partner (Audit Partner 2) of a big four firm stated that their 
target at the moment in the near future is to reach 70% black staff and they were currently 
on an actual number of around 50%. This partner went on to state that other big four firms 
may be doing even better and that would mean that the largest “black firms” in terms of 
number of staff were actually the big four firms, not the so-called “black-owned firms”. The 
main point being made was that the IRBA needed to recognise these transformation 
achievements at the firms and therefore no focus on changing legislation to achieve 
transformation, especially not through MAFR. 
 
Two of the partners interviewed were managing partners of leading South African black-
owned firms and so their opinion on MAFR is particularly significant in light of the IRBA’s 
transformation objectives. The one managing partner of a black-owned firm was of the 
opinion that MAFR rotation was good for South Africa, and was the only partner of the 
fourteen interviewed in favour of MAFR, albeit tentatively in favour. They were in favour 
provided that significant corporate governance weaknesses were addressed first, most 
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importantly being the dominance of management in the appointment and managing of the 
external auditor, and if MAFR was pursued carefully and in a slow staged process, such as 
via a period of requiring joint audits, to allow the non-big four firms time to gain experience 
with the larger more complex companies. In their opinion, if these issues are not addressed, 
then MAFR will not improve transformation nor auditor independence and audit quality. 
The other qualification this partner made was that the period of the rotation must be 
carefully determined so as not to encourage unfamiliarity and lack of institutional 
knowledge of the client (if too short) or promote familiarity threats (if too long).  
 
The other black-owned firm managing partner was of the opinion that MAFR was not the 
right answer for South Africa, mostly because it would result in a loss of institutional 
knowledge built by the firm. This partner was of the opinion that five year partner rotation 
was sufficient as it allowed the firm to retain the institutional knowledge and experience 
and professionally manage any independence threats through its own firm and professional 
codes and practices. (Refer to Quote 39, Appendix 3) 
 
In addition to these concerns expressed above, this partner was also concerned with the 
likelihood that MAFR will simply become a “game of musical chairs” amongst the big four 
firms, thereby reducing market competition, as well as promoting low-balling of fees to 
secure the appointments. 
 
These opinions from the two managing partners of South Africa’s largest black-owned audit 
firms is significant to the MAFR debate, certainly as far as transformation and market 
concentration aspects are concerned. 
 
9. The problem of over-regulation 
 
All the audit partners interviewed expressed concern over the degree of regulation in the 
profession. In fact it is fair to say that the issue of over-regulation resulted in the strongest 
opinions and even frustration amongst the partners. Many were particularly concerned over 
the public inspections reports performed by the IRBA and feared that additional regulation 
was damaging the ability of the practitioners to make professional judgement calls, 
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something absolutely necessary in performing an audit, and which the International 
Standards of Auditing (ISAs) strongly require of the auditor. The concern was simply that 
MAFR would be another unnecessary regulation in an already over-burdened profession. 
(Refer to Quote 40, Appendix 3) 
 
A concerning opinion from all the partners interviewed was the lost appeal as they perceive 
it, that the profession has in the minds of younger chartered accountants and auditors. All 
agreed that the audit profession as a career choice was significantly less appealing than it 
used to be, and this was attributed to over regulation and accompanying risk that has been 
brought to assurance services. Some partners expressed it as a risk-reward imbalance in 
comparison to other professions, as well as compared to being a chartered accountant in 
the corporate market where the remuneration packages, especially considering bonuses 
and share options, when considered with the reduced risk inherent in corporate careers, 
makes the audit profession less appealing. This they believe accounts both for the numbers 
of registered auditors dropping and their continual experience of article clerks, audit 
manager and even audit partners moving out of public practice and into commerce careers. 
This lack of appeal in the profession, compared to corporate careers was also raised as a 
significant reason why the firms were struggling to meet transformation objectives. Black 
staff who qualified in their firms were continually leaving for careers outside of public 
practice. (Refer to Quotes 41, 42 and 43, Appendix 3) 
 
These concerns around regulation are significant. This sentiment was expressed by every 
partner interviewed. Of particular concern is the link to the added regulation that MAFR 
would bring, with its added pressure to compete for business, and the opinion of the audit 
partners that it will further fuel the risk and pressure in the audit industry, resulting in the 
career as an audit practitioner becoming less appealing to chartered accountants. Surely a 
reduced talent pool of aspiring audit partners would be a great risk to audit quality in 
future?   
 
The impact of the change to international audit standards around audit reporting was raised 
by a couple of the partners as an example of additional and important communication that 
the auditor can now provide the stakeholders (refer to the new ISA 701 Communicating Key 
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Audit Matters). This will go a long way in their opinion to better inform the public and allow 
them to better understand what the auditor does and it will provide a good medium for the 
auditor to communicate real practical audit risk areas. The point being made here in relation 
to MAFR is that the changes required by ISA 701 will go a long way to address the need for 
better communication between the auditor and the public about the audit engagement, as 
well as changing public perception about auditor independence. In the view of all partners 
interviewed there is an expectation gap between reality and perception when it comes to 
auditor function and auditor independence. Perhaps the requirements of ISA 701 will help 
bridge the perception and expectation gap around the audit function and auditor 
independence? (Refer to Quote 45, Appendix 3) 
 
Chapter 5:  Summary and Conclusion 
This section presents summary of the findings and an explanation as to the importance of 
the results, including recommended areas for further future research.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the opinions of experienced audit practitioners with 
regards to legislated audit firm rotation, considering that the South African audit regulator 
(IRBA) views mandatory rotation as a possible partial solution to the threats of familiarity to 
auditor independence. The views of the audit profession, who act as an important 
stakeholder in the pursuit of quality financial reporting, needs to be understood in order to 
explore the possible direct and indirect consequences of changing legislation in favour of 
firm rotation. The response by audit practitioners to key questions around the need for, and 
the effects of, audit firm rotation, will be useful to academics in performing further research 
in this area, as well as to regulators, most notably the IRBA.   
 
The semi-structured and open-ended interviews with the fourteen senior partners, plus the 
interview with the CEO of the regulator (IRBA), a South African representative at the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and the Chairman of the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, achieved, in the opinion of the 
researcher, the point referred to as “saturation” in the data collection process. Saturation is 
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believed to have been reached in these interviews in the sense that no new themes or 
categories surrounding the question of MAFR emerged in the last interviews, indicating that 
the sample of fourteen practitioners was sufficient for the purpose of the study.  
 
From this study it is fair to conclude that the general consensus of audit partners 
interviewed is that they are not in favour of MAFR as a means to address auditor 
independence, nor transformation and market concentration. Most do not believe that the 
reality of auditor independence is a problem but rather the problem lies in public 
perceptions of auditor independence and that the regulator should be careful not to react 
inappropriately to problems of public perception. Corporate governance practices are seen 
as the best means of addressing any actual deficiencies in auditor independence, as any real 
deficiencies, if they exist, are a result of poor governance practices in companies, not poor 
auditor ethics.  
 
There is a strong feeling that MAFR will result in significant unintended consequences, most 
notably a reduction in audit quality, the very reason that the IRBA is considering MAFR. If a 
system of MAFR is implemented in South Africa the feeling is that this reduction in audit 
quality will likely come about because of a resultant decrease in competition, again being 
counter to the IRBA’s intentions, and also because it will further reduce the appeal of 
younger accountants to pursue careers as audit practitioners. The perceived over-regulation 
of the profession was a significant theme expressed by all audit partners. The sentiment 
around over-regulation did however centre on the public inspections practice of the IRBA, 
but all partners believed that a move to MAFR would add to the already excessive risk and 
regulation in the industry. It was strongly felt that any more moves towards making the 
audit profession less appealing to younger accountants will severely impact audit quality in 
future as the talent pool diminishes.  
 
Can the audit firms handle the added costs that they believe MAFR will impose? Most say 
that they cannot, and the increased tendering activity will itself have unintended 
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Some partners were in favour of joint audit regulations as an alternative to MAFR, believing 
that this would better achieve the objectives of audit quality, improved competition and 
improved transformation, without many of the negative consequences of MAFR. However, 
the counter opinion was that joint audits impose much unnecessary duplication of work and 
costs which would need to be absorbed by either the firms or the audit clients. Audit 
partners who have had experience with joint audits express opinions both for and against 
joint audit systems. 
 
In conclusion it is fair to say that the participants interviewed are strongly against MAFR and 
stress its many negative consequences. Even the “black-owned” audit firm partners are not 
clearly in favour of MAFR. Only one partner of the fourteen, one of the partners of the 
black-owned firms was tentatively in favour of MAFR. They were in favour provided that 
significant corporate governance weaknesses were addressed first, most importantly being 
the dominance of management in the appointment and managing of the external auditor, 
and if MAFR was pursued carefully and in a slow staged process, such as via a period of 
requiring joint audits, to allow the non-big four firms time to gain experience with the larger 
more complex companies. In this participant’s opinion, if these issues are not addressed, 
then MAFR will not improve transformation nor auditor independence and audit quality. All 
the other partners interviewed were against any move to change legislation in favour of 
MAFR. 
 
Latest developments and contribution of the study  
 
In August 2016 the regulator (IRBA) officially announced its plans to implement mandatory 
audit firm. The regulator will consult further with the industry before making a final decision 
regarding the specific regulation details to amend legislation (Ziady, 2016). The IRBA the 
confirmed in September 2016 that its investor and public participation process around the 
new requirements for mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) will open on October 25 when 
it will issue the proposed new requirements. Written responses must be submitted by 
interested and affected parties (IAPs) by the closing date of December 24. The requirements 
are likely to affect JSE-listed and other public interest entities, although the regulator 
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stresses that the proposed scope and transitional arrangements currently may well be 
influenced by feedback obtained during the consultation (IRBA, 2016). 
 
The findings of this study will aid the regulator and other parties involved in understanding 
and then addressing the concerns of the audit profession regarding MAFR, determining the 
nature and extent of proposed changes to legislation and addressing the potential for 
unintended consequences.  
 
Limitations of the study and areas for further research 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine the breadth of the issues relevant to the 
discussion of implementing legislated MAFR, from the perspectives of experienced 
registered auditors. The study documented the opinions of fourteen experienced registered 
auditors and was not intended to be representative of the opinions of the entire audit 
profession in South Africa. In addition, the study was limited to only the opinions of audit 
practitioners, as opposed to other key stakeholders in quality financial reporting. It can be 
argued that certain groups within the audit profession, such as big four firm partners, 
“black-owned” audit partners, or mid-tier firm partners, have differing vested interests in 
whether MAFR is implemented. This study did incorporate and discuss the views of certain 
groups, but again these opinions cannot be considered representative of any particular 
grouping of partners.  
 
Through the data collection and analysis it is submitted that the point referred to as 
saturation, where no new categories or themes emerged, was achieved. This signals that 
data collection is complete (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006), indicating that the selection 
of fourteen practitioners was sufficient for the purpose of the study. The natural next step 
in the research will be to produce a national field survey, informed by the results of this 
study, using a questionnaire methodology and distributed to the survey population, namely 
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The analysis of these audit partner opinions has brought significant additional themes and 
categories to the fore that need to be incorporated into the national field survey of audit 
partners. These additional factors can be summarised in the following questions: 
 
 Is there a need for improved auditor independence? 
 Is public perception of independence a significant factor driving the perceived need 
to improve auditor independence through MAFR? 
 Are issues of audit quality, transformation and market concentration appropriate 
objectives for the implementation of MAFR? Are these competing objectives as far 
as MAFR regulation is concerned?  
 What is the role of the audit committee in strengthening auditor independence? 
 What is the quality and independence the functioning of audit committees around 
auditor independence considerations? 
 What is the likelihood and nature of the following unintended consequences of 
MAFR? Namely regarding the following issues: 
o A loss of knowledge and experience 
o The distraction of requiring to source new business 
o Unmanageable costs as incoming auditor and in pursuing audit tenders 
o Incentive for audit firms to move away from assurance services 
o Audit fee low-balling by firms to secure tenders 
o The conflict of MAFR with section 90(2) of the Companies Act 
 What is the consensus regarding possible alternatives to MAFR, such as: 
o Mandatory audit tendering 
o Combined (joint) audits 
o Audit manager rotation 
o Strengthening the role, composition and function of the audit committees 
o Seek means to change public perception of auditor independence and the 
nature of the audit function 
 Should, and will, market concentration be addressed by MAFR? 
 What will be the impact of MAFR on transformation in the profession? 
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 Is there a significant problem of over regulation in the profession and is MAFR likely 
to worsen the problem? 
 With MAFR, will auditors adopt a less co-operative negotiation strategy? (Wang & 
Tuttle, 2009) 
 What measures would improve the effectiveness of the existing audit committees 
that comply with current legislation e.g. independence and competence? 
 Considering the possibility of diminishing the attraction of a career as a registered 
auditor, explore the impact on the audit profession. 
 How does or should an audit firm address the issue of lack of knowledge/increased 





72 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 1:  Interview Sheet 
 
Research Title: Exploring a South African solution to an international concern over 
auditor independence through specific consideration of mandatory 
audit firm rotation (MAFR). 
Note: I will provide you with a copy of these questions, so that you may add to or 
modify your responses to any of them afterwards by email. 
MAFR = “mandatory audit firm rotation” 
 
Q: In your opinion, what is the current state of auditor independence in South Africa, as you 








Q: Should South Africa follow the EU and UK and implement MAFR? What do you perceive 
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Q: Can you provide your opinion on the following alternatives? 








 Joint Audits (Joint Audit Firms). 






















Q: IRBA believes that MAFR will address market concentration of audit services and create a 








Q: IRBA believes that MAFR will promote transformation by creating more opportunities for 
small and mid-tier audit firms to enter certain markets, provided they are competent to 








Q: In your opinion, if MAFR was to be considered in South Africa, and assuming IRBA enforce 
some form of MAFR: 
 After how many years should an audit firm be required to rotate? 
 Which audited entities should MAFR apply to? 
 What should be the cooling off period for the audit firm? 
 Describe any exemptions which could be granted. 
 What role could MAFR play in developing the audit industry in South Africa? 
 
 









For the purposes of the next 2 Questions: An article by a senior audit partner in the 
September 2015 Financial Mail magazine (refer below) states that there is a dangerous 
decline in the number of audit partners.  
To quote from the article: 
 SOUTH Africa could be on the brink of a large corporate failure unless systemic constraints in 
the auditing profession are addressed urgently.  
 These threats stem largely from the decline in the number of registered auditors in the 
country. According to the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) annual report 
for 2014, these figures have fallen over the past five years from 4 398 to 4 281 at the end of 
last year. This is due to the decrease in new registrations over the same period from 370 to 
only 219 annually.  
 The falling registered auditor numbers, for example, have been evident for more than a 
decade, despite the number of local chartered accountants having grown by almost 50% over 
the same period. We are simply not seeing a conversion from CA to registered auditor.  
 And the factors that inhibit such aspirations are well known. Increased regulation, the threat 
posed by unlimited liability in the event of auditing errors and growing scrutiny by the IRBA 
of audit files and audit firms all contribute to the profession failing to attract new 
practitioners. The seven-year process to qualify as a registered auditor also does little to 
encourage new entrants. 
 The combination of these factors means that while regulation and governance rules have 
been tightened, registered auditors are under tremendous pressure to meet these standards 
from a shrinking pool of talent. 
 The reduction of the pool of registered auditors will impair the quality of audit and oversight 
services, which large corporates can hardly afford. 
 This demands a long, hard look at the auditing profession and the mechanisms employed to 
attract and then retain the top talent in the industry. 
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Q: Do you believe that MAFR will accelerate this reduction in Chartered Accountants 








Q: Do you foresee any direct and indirect consequences, including any unintended 
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Appendix 2:  Interviews with select non-audit persons (Key 
experts) 
 
Interview with the Chief Executive Officer of the Independent Regulatory Board 
for Auditors (IRBA) – Mr Bernard Agulhas, CA (SA) 
 
Date:   3 December 2015 
Time:  14:00-16:00 
Venue:  JSE Offices, Sandton, Johannesburg  
Present: Bernard Agulhas (IRBA CEO) 
Herman Thlako (IRBA Manager: Office of the CEO) 
  Michael Harber (UCT Lecturer) 
 
The following notes and information is a product of this meeting. 
 
The objective of the IRBA is to endeavour to protect the financial interests of the South African 
public and international investors in South Africa through the effective and appropriate regulation of 
audits conducted by registered auditors, in accordance with internationally recognised standards 
and processes. (IRBA, 2016a) 
 
Upcoming decision: 
The Board of the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) is meeting in July 2016 to make 
a decision on whether they intend to pursue mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) in South Africa in 
principle. If the IRBA decided to pursue MAFR then is would likely be another couple of years before 
legislation could be changed accordingly and the rules implemented. In 2015 IRBA have been 
performing roadshows and seeking consultation with various stakeholders around their perspective 
on MAFR (IRBA, 2015a, 2015c). A consultation paper was issued in this regard specifically in October 
2015, requesting comment from executive and non-executive directors (IRBA, 2015a). 
 
Consultation Paper and Workshop on measures to strengthen auditor independence: 
Given the importance of responding to the need to strengthen auditor independence, the IRBA 
Board had a workshop in July 2015 and received comment from audit firms. IRBA also issued a 
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consultation paper in October 2015, requesting comment from executive and non-executive 
directors. (IRBA, 2015a) 
 
According to the consultation paper, the main reasons why the Board must consider further 
measures to strengthen auditor independence are the following: 
 It will strengthen auditor independence and so protect the public and investors, which is 
part of the IRBA’s strategy; 
 It will address market concentration of audit services and create a more competitive 
environment, which will positively influence audit quality; and 
 It will promote transformation by creating more opportunities for small and mid-tier audit 
firms to enter certain markets, provided they are competent to audit in those markets. 
(IRBA, 2015a)  
 
The Board therefore resolved that the IRBA will spend the following 12 months to perform further 
research and consult with various stakeholders to obtain more information to take an informed 
decision on how auditor independence could be strengthened. In the meantime, the Board resolved 
that all audit reports should disclose the number of years which a firm has been the auditor of an 
entity, to enable investors and the public to determine whether there has been a long association 
between an audit firm and their client. The IRBA follows a due process before it imposes any new 
requirements on auditors and will consult with various stakeholders during this process. The IRBA 
will ultimately consider how it can best protect the public interest. 
 
The proposed process for this research project is as follows: 
1. The IRBA will undertake a potential impact analysis of these proposed measures. 
2. During the impact analysis, it will embark on an outreach to key stakeholders. This may 
include meetings, presentations and awareness raising activities. 
3. As information is received, the IRBA will collate and discuss feedback with the Board. This 
will follow a process of: 
a. identifying the relevant risks to auditor independence and whether it is considered 
high, medium or low risk; 
b. identifying factors that mitigate the risk and consider if it is a strong or weak 
mitigating factor; 
c. Evaluating the residual risks; and 
d. Considering a course of action/recommendation if necessary. 
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Based on the potential regulatory impact analysis, the IRBA will make recommendations to the 
Board. The Board will then make the final decision. 
 
A request for comment: 
Non-executive and Executive Directors have been identified as a major stakeholder for the auditing 
profession and the IRBA. The IRBA therefore wishes to solicit views on the potential impact that 
these measures identified above will have on you. The IRBA is particularly interested to obtain views 
on the following:  
 
1. Which of the measure(s) stated above, in your opinion, will achieve the intended objectives 
of the IRBA? 
2. In your opinion, if MAFR was to be considered in South Africa: 
a. After how many years should an audit firm be required to rotate? 
b. Which audited entities should MAFR apply to? 
c. What should be the cooling off period for the audit firm? 
d. Describe any exemptions which could be granted. 
e. What role could MAFR play in the developing the audit industry in South Africa? 
3. In your opinion, if MAT was to be considered in South Africa: 
a. After how many years should the audit be subjected to public tendering? 
b. Which audited entities should MAT apply to? 
c. How many times can the auditors be reappointed to the same entity? 
d. Describe any exemptions which could be granted. 
4. What role could MAT play in the developing the audit industry in South Africa? In your 
opinion, if joint audits were to be considered in South Africa: 
a. How could some continuity be ensured (e.g., through a staggered approach)? 
b. How often should sections of the audit be rotated between the joint auditors? 
c. For how long should two audit firms be joint auditors of the client? 
d. What role could the joint audits play in the developing the audit industry in South 
Africa? 
5. In your opinion, is there any additional measure(s) that the IRBA should consider to obtain 
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The four key pillars of IRBA 
At the forefront of IRBA’s mind in the MAFR debate, is the need to pursue a solution that (1) meets 
the objective of IRBA, but also (2) to be consistent with the priorities set out in the “four key pillars”. 
 
IRBA’s objective is to endeavour to protect the financial interests of the South African public and 
international investors in South Africa through the effective and appropriate regulation of audits 
conducted by registered auditors, in accordance with internationally recognised standards and 
processes. Therefore the financial interest of the public is utmost priority in the MAFR decision. 
 
However the four key pillars are also important, namely: 
1. Comprehensive regulator: To provide for a more comprehensive regulatory model 
that includes the regulation of Professional Accountancy Organisations (PAO). The 
Minister of Finance has given in-principle approval that the IRBA will assume this 
responsibility. 
2. Independence. Strengthening both the independence of the IRBA and the 
independence of registered auditors. 
3. Leadership in Africa. Implement programmes which will contribute to enhancing 
and improving overall reporting, governance and regulatory practices on the African 
continent. 




Therefore, the question of whether MAFR will promote transformation is also a key question in 
IRBA’s opinion. 
 
The Public Inspections Report 
IRBA performs inspections on selected firms to evaluate their performance on a selection of audit 
engagements, as well as the design and effectiveness of their quality control policies and 
procedures. The report provides an analysis of key findings arising from firm and engagement 
inspections performed by the Inspections Department of the IRBA. The latest report was published 
in December 2015 and covers audits for the year ended 31 March 2015, and also includes an 
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IRBA is concerned that a few of the findings relate to relevant ethical requirements, and more 
specifically issues whereby independence may be considered the root cause. A root cause was 
identified as “Failure to fortify the importance of professional scepticism and the independence of 
the engagement team so as to overcome the threats that could develop as a result of their 
relationship with clients”, as well as “Failure to strengthen and maintain independence as an 
underlying principle for high audit quality.” (IRBA, 2015b) 
 
 
Source: IRBA 2014/2015 Public Inspections Report (IRBA, 2015b) 
 
The above graph from the latest 2014/2015 Public Inspections Report shows a worrying breach of 
ethical requirements, both relative to other issues, but also in the comparison made to International 
Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) Inspections Workshop. The IFIAR inspection findings 
survey of 29 member countries as a percentage of inspected firms with deficiencies per ISQC1 
element inspected. It should be noted that the IFIAR results represent the largest six global network 
firms, whereas the results for South Africa span the entire population of large, medium and small 
auditing firms that were inspected. 
 
IRBA Newsletter 32 – Dec 2015 
The IRBA Inspection Committee reported on 37 audit firm and 375 audit engagement inspections for 
the year (IRBA, 2015b, 2015d). Most firms showed one or more deficiencies, including ethics 
(independence), engagement performance and monitoring, which require urgent improvement. A 
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significant number of individual audit engagement files also showed deficiencies that need urgent 
attention. A total of 16% of firms and 6% of engagement partners were referred to the Investigating 
Committee of the IRBA due to fundamental or continued noncompliance with international auditing 
and financial reporting standards, professional codes and legislative requirements. The report also 
emphasises the need for audit firms to urgently address ethics and independence matters, as well as 
engagement quality. (IRBA, 2015b, 2015d) 
 
High-quality auditing and accounting are not only essential for reliable financial reporting, but are 
also critical in protecting the public interest and boosting investor confidence. In fact, compliance 
with auditing standards, ethics, financial reporting standards and legislative requirements is 
fundamental in ensuring a reliable profession that can effectively compete internationally. 
 
Black Chartered Accountant Practitioners (BCAP) 
IRBA recognise the need to promote the black-owned firms in the efforts to promote competition 
and transparency in the audit industry. For example, Sindi Zilwa, co-founder and CEO of Nkonki Inc., 
one of the largest black audit firms, was the second black woman in South Africa to qualify as a 
Chartered Accountant. Another example is SizweNtsalubaGobodo Inc. (SNG), ranked the largest 
black firm with annual revenue of more than R500m, recognised by ABASA (The Association for the 
Advancement of Black Accountants of Southern Africa) for having produced the highest number of 
black chartered accountants in the medium firm category (SNG Inc., 2016). The impact of MAFR on 
the black firms and on transforming the audit profession in general, is important to IRBA. 
 
Government Gazette: Auditing Profession Act, Act 26 of 2005 
This change in legislation was explained to the profession in the IRBA communique titled IRBA 
Strengthens Auditor Independence by Mandating Disclosure of Audit Tenure , issued on 4 December 
2015 (IRBA, 2016b). 
 
This change to the legislation through Government Gazette, makes it mandatory that all auditor's 
reports on Annual Financial Statements shall disclose the number of years which the audit firm / sole 
practitioner has been the auditor of the entity (audit tenure). A predecessor audit firm in this 
context refers to an audit firm where there has been mergers/de-mergers or other combinations in 
the audit firm and an audit firm shall therefore include a predecessor audit firm. Audit tenure refers 
to the length of the auditor-client relationship. Thus tenure includes the period that the predecessor 
audit firms (where there has been mergers/de-mergers or other combinations in the audit firm) 
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issued audit reports on the entity. This rule applies to audit reports issued on the Annual Financial 
Statements of all public interest entities, as defined in the Companies Act of 2008 and prescribed by 
IRBA from time to time, for periods ending on or after 31 December 2015. (IRBA, 2016b) 
  
IRBA made the decision to require the mandatory disclosure of audit tenure in the context of 
strengthening auditor independence which is consistent with measures implemented in other 
jurisdictions. This disclosure of audit tenure will lead to transparency of association between audit 
firms and audit clients. The IRBA will monitor compliance with the above rule for auditor's reports on 




In the opinion of the IRBA, the principle, not the detailed specifics of mandatory audit firm rotation 
(MAFR), must be considered a serious option for South Africa to achieve the following goals: 
 
1. Strengthen auditor independence and audit quality, and so protect the public and investors, 
which is part of the IRBA’s strategy. 
2. It will address market concentration of audit services and create a more competitive 
environment, which will positively influence audit quality. 
3. It will promote transformation by creating more opportunities for small and mid-tier audit 
firms to enter certain markets, provided they are competent to audit in those markets. 
(IRBA, 2015a) 
 
IRBA would require the opinion of all stakeholders in regards to the above possible benefits of 
pursuing MAFR, together with other considerations, both for and against MAFR, including any 
foreseen unintended consequences of such a change to the legislation.  
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Interview with the Chairperson of the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) Consultative Advisory Group (CAG) - Linda De Beer, CA 
(SA)   
 
Mrs Linda De Beer’s Current and Past Professional Roles: 
 Chairperson for the past five years of the International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB) Consultative Advisory Group (CAG) 
 Chairman of the Financial Reporting Investigation Panel (JSE) 
 Member of Committee for Auditing Standards of the Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors (IRBA) 
 Member of the King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa 
 Member of the Issuers' Services Committee of the JSE 
 Member of the Financial Reporting Standards Council established in terms of the Companies 
Act, 2008 
 Visiting professor in financial accounting at the University of the Witwatersrand 
 Non-executive director of a JSE listed Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”)  
 
Date:   26 January 2016 
Time:  15:30-17:30 
Venue:  Sandton, Johannesburg  
Present: Linda De Beer, CA (SA) 
  Michael Harber (UCT Lecturer) 
 
Considering the experience of committees that Mrs Linda De Beer CA (SA), as well as the national 
and international committees which she is a part of, the CEO of IRBA, Bernard Agulhas, 
recommended that I meet with Linda De Beer to discuss the topic of mandatory audit firm rotation 
(MAFR). Of particular significance regarding the experience of Linda De Beer, is her role as 
Chairperson and South African representative on the IAASB Consultative Advisory Group (CAG). This 
advisory group has representatives of international regulatory bodies such as the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (the international banking regulator), as well as the World Bank, the 
European Commission and the World Federation of Exchanges, just to name a few. The full list of 
member organisations can be found on the IAASB website (IAASB, 2016). Linda De Beer has also 
considered the issue of auditor independence in depth in her capacity as a member of the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa. The King III Report on Governance and the 
soon to be finalised King IV Report addresses the board of director’s responsibilities to ensure 
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Linda De Beer explained that the body she represented on the CAG was the World Federation of 
Exchanges, which is the umbrella body for the 50 largest stock exchanges in the world, of which the 
JSE is one. The CAG is heavily involved in the development of International Standards of Auditing 
(ISAs), both in terms of the strategic and the technical issues relevant to the standards. 
 
Regarding MAFR, the following is a summary of Linda De Beer’s opinions, as gathered during the 
interview: 
 
Overall assessment of whether South Africa should pursue MAFR: 
 
 South Africa is a different environment to Europe so we should proceed with caution, but 
South Africa should move towards MAFR. 
 Auditor independence, both “on the ground” reality, as well as public perception of 
independence, is a concern and should be addressed, as it is being done so in Europe. 
 There is a problem with “scope creep” in the audit profession, whereby the longer the 
tenure of the auditor, the more non-assurance work they become involved in. This impairs 
independence by growing familiarity and financial dependence on the client. 
 However, moving suddenly and abruptly to change legislation in favour of MAFR would be 
problematic. A better solution would be a transitional, staggered approach, implemented for 
a number of years, to allow the profession to adjust, before implementing full MAFR. 
 
“I think if we go big bang, and we immediately require mandatory audit firm rotation for all of these 
companies, and fairly short periods, I think things can ‘bomb out’. So my proposal would be to rather 
have options.” 
 
 Linda De Beer explained that having transitional provisions in the Companies Act, such as 
allowing companies to choose between MAFR over longer periods of 7-10 years or longer, or 
implementing joint audits, or starting with mandatory tendering legislation. 
 
“So, I think it’s important that it’s staggered, and I think it’s important that there are options at first 
and that you work towards where you want to be, let’s say in five years’ time or so, you know, all of 
these things must be out of the wash, that there’s some level of certainty because we don’t know 
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 Linda De Beer expressed the concern that the mid-tier firms do not currently have the 
capacity and skill to audit the larger complex entities such as the financial institutions. 
However, a well thought out staggered approach towards MAFR would allow them to up-
skill appropriately. 
 The South African Companies Act, 2008 has implemented transitional provisions in the past, 
for example with the requirements for memorandums of incorporation and for social and 
ethics committees. The precedent is there for transitional provisions in the Act. 
 
Responses to specific concerns raised by the audit profession: 
 
 In some examples, firms have been the auditors for decades. This must impair their 
independence. What does the profession realistically expect the public to think in such 
cases? 
 Unfortunately it is true that the IRBA is under pressure to response in kind to the legislative 
changes in Europe. There is pressure on South Africa as a leading developing country to 
show that it is following international governance and public protection trends. 
 Joint audits are a good option to consider. The mid-tier firms are in a position to partake in 
joint audits of listed companies and all the problems associated with joint audits, such as 
duplication of work, skills and resource capacity, can be overcome.  
 The outgoing auditor in a system of MAFR will not be incentivised to reduce their attention 
on the client because they need to source replacement work. Quite the opposite. The 
outgoing auditor will be concerned that the incoming auditor may detect poor audit quality 
so there is the incentive to maintain audit quality until the end of the rotation period. 
 The incoming auditors are an important “a new set of eyes” on the client. There will not be a 
significant drop in audit quality in the first year or two for the new auditor because they will 
be eager to prove themselves and add value. More work will be required by the incoming 
auditor, and this will reduce profitability in the early years of the engagement, but the 
auditor is a professional and will want to contribute and maintain an acceptable level of 
audit quality despite their relative unfamiliarity. Therefore they will simply work harder. 
 The new thoughts, new ideas and management comments provided by the incoming auditor 
will be valuable. 
 There will be a marked increase in tendering activity, however this will force the audit firms 
to become more practical and economical in the tendering process. Too much time and 
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money is currently spend by audit firms on making proposals to audit committees. The 
auditors will need to streamline their tender processes. 
 There is a need to strengthen the quality of the audit committee and its decision-making, 
however there has already been a large improvement in this over the past number of years. 
This line of reasoning has no strong bearing of the MAFR debate.  
 As is currently the case (section 94 of the Act) guideline provisions can be provided to the 
audit committees to help them apply their minds within the framework of the legislation. 
MAFR will not remove key professional judgement from the audit committee. 
 The public interest score categories needs to be adjusted. A score of 350 is simply too low. 
 The reduction in the number of registered auditors is not a satisfactory argument against 
MAFR, but rather a product of two primary factors: 
o Many companies are not required to be audited under the new South African 
Companies Act, 2008, depending on the public interest score for private companies. 
Therefore there is a reduced demand for audit. 
o The audit profession is not changing and repositioning itself appropriately to be an 
employer of choice for chartered accountants. The audit firms are still operating on 
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Meeting with the Chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance in 
South Africa - Mervyn King SC 
 
Mr Mervyn King’s Current and Past Professional Roles: 
 Former judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa 
 Chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa 
 First Vice-President of the Institute of Directors Southern Africa 
 Chairman of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) 
 Chairman emeritus of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
 Member of the South Africa Securities Regulation Panel (regulates certain mergers and 
acquisitions transactions) 
 Chairman of Strate (South Africa's Central Securities Depository) 
 From 2000 to 2008, King was the South African representative on the International Chamber 
of Commerce's International Court of Arbitration in Paris 
 Director and Audit Committee Chairman of many listed companies in South Africa and 
internationally 
 
Date:   19 April 2016 
Time:  09:30-10:00 
Venue:  Henley Business School Greenlands, Henley-on-Thames Oxfordshire, UK 
Present: Mervyn King SC 
  Michael Harber (UCT Lecturer) 
 
Mr Mervyn King SC was presented with the nature of the study, research methodology and summary 
of the findings. The following key input and opinions were provided by Mr Mervyn King SC: 
 
 MAFR is likely to have significant unintended consequences if implemented in South Africa. 
The regulator needs to proceed carefully. 
 South Africa should not follow the direction of Europe with MAFR. Rather, South Africa 
should start with a system of joint audits for certain categories of companies (higher levels 
of public interest). 
 MAFR should only be implemented for reasons of audit quality and public protection. It 
would be unwise to pursue MAFR for any other reasons, namely transformation and market 
competition. 
 There are more suitable means of achieving other priorities such as transformation and 
market competition. 
 The restrictions placed on auditors in South Africa in terms of Section 90, namely regarding 
the inability to provide accounting services to audit clients, will be a significant inhibitor or 
concern for audit firms to fully respond to MAFR as intended. The regulator should address 
this potential conflict. 
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Appendix 3:  Extract of quotes from interview participants 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to document some of the key opinions of the 
interviewees, as extracted from the interview transcripts. These are the quotes that 
have been referenced in the Presentation and Analysis of Results section. 
 
Quote 1 (Audit Partner 12)  
“But then you say on the flipside, you know the counter argument against that, when 
the client is such a dominant number in your world - you know, four or five percent of 
your fees - you can never be independent.  In reality with any client paying fees to 
the practitioner you can never be independent, so you get to the heart of it because 
I’m ultimately coming back to the client for my fee discussion and I can’t be 
independent.  And so whether you do that rotate [MAFR] it’s not going to make a 
difference.”  
 
Quote 2 (Audit Partner 10)  
“If you are asking us a theoretical question, is more regulation around independence 
going to create better independence, because the answer is yes, we don’t need to 
discuss it.”  
 
Quote 3 (Audit Partner 2)  
“If there were let’s say, an error.  We had, I’m thinking of last year, let’s say, we had 
an error with a set of listed companies [a group of companies]. I think it’s an easy 
scapegoat to say “ah, you guys have been for thirty years the auditors and that’s 
why you missed it!”  I think they [the public] missed completely the point. I think 
there’s no correlation between an error and how long you’ve been their auditor. It’s 
mainly because you just missed something the last year, you must understand, it’s 
not because you’ve been here for thirty years because the partners are only there 
five years. That’s definitely for me a perception - that is not a reality. If you want a 
fresh perspective, we do see that where the partner rotates… The partner comes in 
with new ideas and so I think that gets actually done.” 
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Quote 4 (Audit Partner 5) 
“I’m just a bit concerned that there’s a degree of over-reaction around things and 
that really worries me.  I mean, we are professionals at the end of the day. 
Independence ethics is the cornerstone of what we do… you know, the firms have 
their policies and procedures in place around ethics and independence and it’s taken 
very seriously. So, I mean we have, ours [referring to the firm] is even narrower than 
most and likewise what IRBA and the codes have got in place, so it’s extremely rigid. 
I’m just a bit worried that this heightened focus, too much focus on it...by all and 
sundry, various stakeholders. I’m worried that the regulator’s jumping onto 
something because this is what’s happened overseas.  We’re number one in terms of 
World Bank Risk Report.” 
Quote 5 (Audit Partner 5) 
“You’re personally invested. It’s my name. I’ve signed. You’re out there in the public... 
You’re holding yourself out there.  It’s me, it’s not [firm name], I’m signing there as 
well.”  
Quote 6 (Audit Partner 1) 
“the Audit Committees that I have served on over the years and continue to serve on 
now take auditor independence very seriously.  Our firm and my experience of the 
other big firms, I can’t talk for the smaller and medium sized firms… the audit firms 
themselves take auditor independence extremely seriously… If you just consider that 
South Africa is the pre-eminent market as far as implementation of corporate 
governance King III etcetera is concerned, it really is at the top of its game. And 
those Audit Committees are very diligent and they take all of the issues - not just 
auditor independence, all of their budgetary duties… very seriously.”  
Quote 7 (Audit Partner 12) 
“We are ‘beating the pack’ anyway so why more corporate governance [referring to 
the Global Competitiveness Reports issued every year by the World Economic Forum]. 
We are beating the pack worldwide, we have good governance and it’s vigorous and 
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you know if you follow the principle set out for the independent non-executives it’s 
that they are not independent.  I have a beef with a non-executive director who’s 
been there for twenty years - so where is the rotation? So for twenty years as a non-
executive you’d say well you are not independent, so you know rather look at the 
independence of the non-executive directors through the IOD (Institute of Directors) 
and other lobby groups and King III as opposed to the auditors.  I think the auditors 
are a lot more independent than the non-executive… so you know you don’t want the 
CEO’s friends as non-executives.  You want true non-executive directors… but the 
guys do take their job seriously.  Many non-executives take their job seriously.  You 
know our Audit Committees have very vigorous processes. I attend a lot of Audit 
Committees and it’s a very vigorous process.  It’s dependent on the non-executive 
and the strength of the non-executives, versus the executives and I think we have got 
good non-executives [in general] than in some smaller company where it is way too 
cosy.  You know we’ve had corporate failures where the non-executives have never 
seen the financials and all those kind of things because those shouldn’t be in the 
profession.”  
 
Quote 8 (Audit Partner 1)  
“the perception might be different [referring to the public’s view of South Africa’s 
commitment to corporate governance and auditing standards, including its 
implementation thereof] and so I suppose my point of departure would be I have to 
seriously question that mandatory rotation is in any way going to [improve audit 
quality]”  
 
Quote 9 (Audit Partner 1)  
“If I were an Audit Committee member or an Audit Committee Chair, I would resent 
the responsibility or the power that I inherently have as a non-executive being taken 
away from me. I would much rather see the focus on improving audit governance.  
Because that is where the responsibility is.  It is the Board of Directors that has the 
fiduciary duty.” This particular partner is currently, and has been in the past, an audit 
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Quote 10 (Audit Partner 10) 
“What we experience is, particularly in the mid-tier, is that, if the FD is a big four, he 
is totally prejudiced against everybody outside.  And normally you will find that, 
where there is a change, the firm that he trained at, somehow gets included, or ends 
up getting the job.  I am not necessarily talking about listed companies, let’s say 
larger companies, not listed… And then what we experience with, let’s say larger or 
mid- sized businesses that are not listed, is that, there’s a  perception that they are 
auditors, it’s almost like it’s a given, it’s almost like he is the manager, it’s like a 
permanent employment contract in a way… and to remove them is to “fire them”. 
Yes.  So I think [improving governance practices] would improve independence, like 
as you say the relationship is two-sided and the stricter they are in their corporate 
governance the better the auditor needs to behave I suppose, if you want to call it 
that.”  
 
Quote 11 (Audit Partner 7) 
“I do believe in the sternness of my profession and I do believe that most of the audit 
partners and the firms do uphold independence.  But there is one thing that is a 
threat to it.  Can I call it a threat? It is the practicality of an audit partner’s wish to 
retain an audit being linked into the relationship with management. Versus being 
linked to the audit committee and to the shareholders.  For me, that’s the only thing 
that needs to be changed is if we need to uphold independence.”  
 
Quote 12 (Audit Partner 7) 
“Before we even hear about it as the audit committee, management will box it down 
and these guys are so scared to bring it forward. Then management box it down.  By 
the time it comes to the audit committee it is a “by the way”, watered position. 
Because the management is there and these guys are presenting and they are really 
prepared to fight for it.  The audit committee normally takes a very bad stance of 
saying “management sort it out with the auditors”, and for me that is the only thing 
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Quote 13 (Audit Partner 7) 
“For the audit fee to be approved the audit committee asks ‘have you agreed it [the 
fee] with management?’ ‘Management do you agree?’  ‘Yes?’, then yes we are happy 
and it’s done.  The moment there is a debate in an audit committee between 
management and the auditors about the fee the audit committee chair, or the audit 
committee itself says, ‘please go and sort it out and report back.’” 
 
Quote 14 (Audit Partner 6) 
“In reality, what I’ve seen, the audit committee does not use its power at all and in 
fact you will see and if you track the evolution of the audit profession, there has been 
concern that management tends to be dominating… they do everything. Virtually all 
audit opportunities when the client needs a new auditor, management runs the show 
and in fact it’s management’s decision and the audit committee frankly, what they 
do, is rubber stamp.” 
 
Quote 15 (Audit Partner 7) 
“Sometimes I sit back and I say; is it because the audit committee believe they are 
here because of management? Do they also feel threatened that if management 
don’t like me, they might say I must actually leave the board? I have often had those 
couple of questions in my mind - to say it looks like the issue is the lack of 
independence of the audit committee members in the first place. And now when you 
start to look into it you start to see the retired [audit] partners, or not necessarily 
retired partners, but retirees sitting in these audit committees, so it is their only 
source of income! So maybe it is important for them to keep on, you know.  Because 
now a person is sixty five, seventy… and that’s where they get their income from. So 
maybe there is reduced independence even at that level.”  
 
Quote 16 (Audit Partner 1) 
“I am sure an Audit Committee Chairman and management will tell you that the 
most value an auditor can bring to the auditing process is their deep seated industry 
knowledge and expertise within that particular industry and relating to that 
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organisation. And that institutional knowledge, if you institute mandatory firm 
rotation, is completely lost.” 
 
Quote 17 (Audit Partner 1)  
“When you start out with a new organisation, particularly these massive, multi-
national organisations, you don’t know what you don’t know. As a result you don’t 
know what questions to ask. And for me that is a massive risk relating to mandatory 
firm rotation... You must remember that in a partner rotation it is a very structured 
and managed process.  So, typically what you would do within the more complex 
industries, take financial services or telecommunications as an example… The new 
partner would start shadowing the old partner. He will start learning about the 
industry. And typically the new partner would not be someone who hasn’t had 
exposure to that industry in some shape or form. It would be someone who has a 
base knowledge and then for a period of time they shadow the outgoing partner to 
learn about that particular organisation so that, you know, when he or she takes 
over as the signing partner there is continuity… It is lost with audit firm rotation. And 
what we also find is management at the organisations is changing so frequently 
these days. Very often the only people who have this institutional knowledge of an 
organisation are the audit partners, [especially the more experienced older 
partners].”  
 
Quote 18 (Audit Partner 14)  
“On the other side of the scale I use the word, you promote incompetence… Because 
the incoming auditors are unfamiliar… I can remember for five years [auditing] for 
our firm a fairly big client as a new young partner.  And every year, in fact the 
management was an ex-article clerk [at our firm], and every year both of us said: 
“It’s amazing.  We don’t know how we could have done the previous audit”, given 
how little knowledge we had and what we picked up.  It was literally almost that we 
felt that it doubled every year. The knowledge base. So, you may be improving 
perceived independence, but I think you’re promoting incompetence.  And maybe the 
word is too strong. I think you’re going to give up quality… I know a very senior 
auditor in our friends who says he’s been on some or other [listed company’s Audit 
 
 
96 | P a g e  
 
Committee] for so long and they sit and they listen to him and they listen to his input. 
Now he’s got to send in a young partner and they probably won’t even be interested 
in listening to him, because he knows nothing about the business. [And it’s not his 
fault. He’s just new.] So, I think that I’m concerned. I’m concerned if a regulator 
wants to make a change because of a perception.  Surely there’s other ways of 
addressing a perception.”  
 
Quote 19 (Audit Partner 14)  
“But in your first year your quality is going to be terrible, because you’re not going to 
know what’s going on – [although you may] see new things. But I mean, wouldn’t 
something like a peer review have the same impact?  Although I don’t know whether 
I would like to review some other auditor’s file and criticize him.”  
 
Quote 20 (Audit Partner 1) 
“I audited one of the big three [sector name] companies, rotated off that [normal 
partner rotation] and I have just recently taken on another one [large multi-national 
company]. And having spent probably the better part of fifteen years in the [sector 
name] industry I’ve pretty much thought I knew the industry well, I can tell you the 
new company was very different. [Without my extensive industry experience] it 
would have been even harder… But the institutionalised knowledge of that 
organisation and its issues and its risks… You know, I had to re-learn all of that. And 
in that window period of getting up to speed… I think that there is a risk because the 
auditor is not necessarily in a position to be able to assess the risks within the 
organisation from a financial reporting perspective.  Control reporting perspective 
and respond to those risks. And it is really, my simple thing was when you start out 
with a new organisation, particularly these massive, multi-national organisations 
you don’t know what you don’t know. As a result you don’t know what questions to 
ask. And for me that is a massive risk relating to mandatory firm rotation. You must 
remember that in a partner rotation it is a very structured and managed process.  So, 
typically what you would do is within the more complex industries, take financial 
services or telecommunications as an example and there are others as well. The new 
partner would start shadowing the old partner. He will start learning about the 
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industry… And typically the new partner would not be someone who hasn’t had 
exposure to that industry in some shape or form. It would be someone who has a 
base knowledge and then for a period of time they shadow the outgoing partner. To 
learn about that particular organisation so that, you know, when he or she takes 
over as the signing partner… That’s the continuity… It is lost with audit firm 
rotation.”  
 
Quote 21 (Audit Partner 12)  
“But to start changing your entire audit team in a year - both your first, your second, 
your third year [article clerks] to retrain, or to have a zero knowledge of a client. In 
the order of a magnitude of a Standard Bank [listed banking group] - it’s impossible… 
Now you’ve got a team that has zero knowledge, nor the partner, nor do the 
manager, nor any of the staff have any knowledge of that client.  They come in and 
besides the client to be they won’t be happy about it either… [MAFR is] going to be 
contrary to its intention.”  
 
Quote 22 (Audit Partner 5)  
“So, we know we’re out of the door so basically the idea is going to be - we better 
turn this client, this audit client into an advisory client. So already the focus is going 
to be - I need to turn this thing around and make sure our tax and advisory offerings 
are well entrenched in this client, so that when the day comes, year ten (or whatever 
period MAFR requires), we sign off those accounts, we flip over... Because the audit 
firm’s dealing with very real business considerations, they’ve got staff to pay... We’re 
running a business… So I’m your audit partner year nine or eight, I know I’ve got my 
KPI’s to meet, it’s my client. You know, invariably I am going to end up trying to 
position that I become a bit of an advisory partner so I can switch the auditor role 
into an advisory role. So year nine, I start taking the eyes off the ball on the audit. 
I’m not saying this is going to happen but I’m going to be looking around... So you’ve 
got that - it could happen. I’m not going to say it’s going to, but we are running a 
business and we need to make sure the flow, the income flow is there. Be it from an 
advisory and tax as opposed to the audit line. So one will be looking at that now for 
an incoming firm, year one, a newbie, has no idea about the client, the history, 
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perhaps the industry, limited knowledge on the industry. It’s going to take them a 
few years to get up to speed.”  
 
Quote 23 (Audit Partner 12)  
“Due to total lack of familiarity and knowledge [referring to the new incoming audit 
firm] - you know so the cost will have to go up… The client will be in that thirty 
percent learning curve in year one. And we found that when we had our audits there 
is big learning curve cost in the first year and the clients are saying, you know I am 
not prepared to pay that but if it’s continually rotating and it’s compulsory to [rotate 
firms] the firms will say, you know, that I would want to cover some of that cost.  The 
cost will go up, quality will certainly go down and might never recover and you know 
I’m thinking of the mega complex audits in particular…”  
 
Quote 24 (Audit Partner 8)  
 “Well, I have a theory that low-balling is only done by small firms. Big firms don’t 
need to low-ball. Why? Because they’ve got millions and millions of dollars’ worth of 
other work that, they get profits from. They don’t have to worry about whether [they 
win the tender]. They’re not going to cut corners in audit because they’ve got other 
fees in consulting. The smaller firms have a problem with that. They don’t have that, 
so... They need to secure the business, so they might low-ball. Yes, it’s to stop that 
type of thing. So, If I’m prepared to live with auditor rotation if that type of law 
comes in, because I can tell you now we’ve lost a lot of tenders, just simply on firms 
cutting it by half. If you want audit firm rotation it’s got to be backed up by, (how do 
I put it?). By rules and regulations, governing the tender process and backup, and 
supporter stuff to see that that’s not abused.” 
 
Quote 25 (Audit Partner 11)  
“If they want to regulate more and either put in mandatory audit firm rotation or 
joint audits, why doesn’t the regulator, like with the attorneys, give guidance on 
fees… especially considering low-balling.  Why do the attorneys, if there is quarrel 
about a fee, go and get their fees taxed at the court? There are set rates that apply 
and it gets taxed and that’s what you can charge, especially in a court case as well. 
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It’s done with a cost order, and they tell you this is what the cost is, you know it’s not 
your full invoice amount, normally it’s calculated by the court. So as regulator, why 
can’t [IRBA] research and have a look what happens in Europe and the UK, audit fees 
compared to a risk rating for a company, turnover, number of employees… or a PI 
score, or to a percentage of turnover or assets.  Just to give a range where the audit 
fees should be. It gives guidance one to the audit committee... and also to the 
auditor.”  
 
Quote 26 (Audit Partner 9)  
“And what has that done for [them]?  It’s allowed them to grow to a size which it 
would never have grown to before and it’s exposed the firm to work which they 
would never have been exposed to if, for instance, they were in the United Kingdom. 
So let’s take the United Kingdom as an example, I don’t know if you’re aware in the 
United Kingdom but in the top 100 companies in the United Kingdom, 99 are audited 
by the big four firms.”  
 
Quote 27 (Audit Partner 9)  
“So, you know, we built the practice which is capable in handling that kind of work 
and we do handle that kind of work. But it’s kind of the chicken and the egg situation 
if you’re not exposed to it… So even if they get given say a 65%/35% [split] and the 
smaller firm got 35% of the work, they would be able to break their teeth on the 
nature of the work – work that they’re currently almost excluded from at the 
moment.  It means they can take a long term view on their practice. They can gear 
up. They can spend money on putting in the kind of infrastructure and the kind of 
governance that you need to play in that space. And if you’ve got joint audit with 
some kind of mandatory tendering at the end of the process and you do that 
properly, well, that might be an alternative [to MAFR]”  
 
Quote 28 (Audit Partner 5)  
“I’ve been exposed to that over the years as you know, at [client name], that’s how 
we got involved in [client name] in the early days when it was still a society and in 
terms of its Act of Incorporation, you needed two sets of auditors.  The incumbent 
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when the two firms merged, they became one firm and they had to appoint another 
set, that’s how we got involved.  So I’ve had at least nine or ten years’ experience 
within joint audits and it’s extremely painful.  It’s costly, it’s ineffective. I don’t see 
[how it contributes to independence]. I just see lots of duplication, overlap, you 
know, every meeting you go - two auditors have got to go along.  And maybe the two 
partners, the two managers - that’s four of you. All billing time. Every document, so 
everyone’s pouring over it, giving input into the Audit Committee submission. And I in 
the bank sector, I think they mandated to have joint audits… in that field, okay 
maybe... Because of the increased risk. But not joint audits for public interest 
entities. I just think it’s totally not practical, quite frankly.” 
 
Quote 29 (Audit Partner 6)  
“I think South Africa has a brilliant opportunity to achieve two-in-one.  One, the 
quality of auditor independence increases, yes people will argue that there is an 
increase of cost and duplication of work. You can manage it. Duplication is limited. 
And guess what, you have it anyway with the banks.  How do they manage it? So 
don’t use cost as that [an argument against joint audits]. Guess what? Players like us 
are happy to absorb that cost.”  
 
Quote 30 (Audit Partner 5)  
“I think all you’re going to do is have ‘the shifting of the deck chairs’. The big four 
will remain the big four. There might be the transformation angle so maybe the big 
five.  You know I’m saying, given the South African avenue here and you might, let’s 
be fair, call it the big five, that it’s going to be a ‘shifting of the deck chairs’. That’s 
all that’s going to happen. Is the Audit Committee, given the strength of the Audit 
Committee, are they honestly going to appoint a firm that clearly hasn’t had the 
experience, doesn’t have the resources, the staff, to do a large listed company audit? 
No disrespect to the second tier firms or let’s call it the next tier.  I mean, clients 
expecting us to have the depth and breadth of skill and how these smaller firms 
going to acquire that skills and also have the ability to deliver seamless service 
across numerous jurisdictions.  Our clients expect us to be in every location where 
they’re located and they want us to speak with one voice.  How are these other firms 
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going to do that?  If you look at what has gone out to tender, the, from what I 
understand in the UK and the likes, it’s really just shifting it around and there’s no 
major... So when they, and those that have gone out to tender, where has it gone? 
You’ll most probably find that the smaller firms, one of them will get invited to come 
and tender, but they’ll fall out somewhere along the process. [It is not going to 
address market concentration], it’s just going to shift between the big five, put it 
that way. That’s honestly the way I see it.”  
 
Quote 31 (Audit Partner 2)  
“Because there’s only going to be three left.  There’s no way that a mid-tier firm will 
do the [company name] audit in 130 countries within the next twenty years.”  
 
Quote 32 (Audit Partner 14)  
“But what I want to come to, is typically when we get an opportunity to make a 
proposal for a big public company that’s audited by the big four, and you go there 
and you really… I mean, in this one instance we really went to town with the 
presentation.  And in the meeting you can pick up that people are quite positive, and 
then you get the letter saying no, they’re staying with the current big four auditor. So 
on reflection, think about it, you’re an independent, non-executive director on an 
Audit Committee where you’re at risk. So are you really going to change the 
incumbent… to ‘Joe Soap’? To a non-big four? Or just change from the big four? Let’s 
say they do it. Let’s say they’ve got that type of appetite for risk, or perceived risk. 
And they do it, and it’s a stuff-up. [Then their heads are on the block.] If they had 
moved from big four firm to big four firm then… nobody could fault that. You would 
went from the same to another… you’re just going to go in a circle. That’s not going 
to improve market concentration at all. You may even see a movement up to the 
bigger firms.”  
 
Quote 33 (Audit Partner 3)  
“I’ll give you an example… I have just gone through a proposal process. It’s not a 
large firm. It’s actually mid-market firm. I went to see the chair of the Audit 
Committee afterwards and he gave me the feedback and one of the things he 
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specifically said was, it was clear to them, the Audit Committee and the panel. It was 
not just the Audit Committee - management was a part of the panel. That there was 
a big difference in the quality of the whole process and the documents and the 
presentations. Between the big four and the next tier. That was clear [to them]. He 
then immediately said “forget about anything below the big four”.”  
 
Quote 34 (Audit Partner 12)  
“We don’t have the skillset for the banks and then the insurance companies as well - 
unless they are really small, so you can pick on a mega insurance company.  You 
know we don’t have the manpower and then to gear up the manpower for five years 
you know… [from a business perspective] you can’t, commercially…”  
 
Quote 35 (Audit Partner 12)  
“What can happen is you know the guys will cheat like they are cheating on the 
section 90 [of the Companies Act], they will loan their teams around or a team will 
come and they will be here for five years and the guy will bring his team along and 
you will find the same people will do [the audit]… a kind of secondment.”  
 
Quote 36 (Audit Partner 12)  
“it’s the same team but they had different houses, so the guys have to have the 
economic necessity to do that.  So I really don’t have a warm feeling or a strong 
recommendation for mandatory audit rotation and I really don’t think that audit 
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Quote 37 (Audit Partner 4) 
“I think it was, it could be Brazil… What happened when they realised that a big 
team, let’s say a [company name] team will do the audit and then a year before the 
whole firm has moved to let’s say to [firm name] or another firm, the other firm 
starts headhunting them and then effectively, that whole team is moving and his 
partner is moving across to the new firm.  Now how’s that for independence? It is 
just under a different umbrella somewhere and another firm must sign it, but it’s the 
same team. So to overcome this cost and knowledge and all those things, this team 
just moves over.”  
 
Quote 38 (Audit Partner 10)  
“We can’t just take a black firm and a traditional western firm and merge them 
because of transformation and think it would be the right thing to do. There are still 
certain things that those of us from a privileged background maybe just don’t 
understand about the way people work and the issues that they’ve had to deal with 
that we are not used to.” 
 
Quote 39 (Audit Partner 6)  
“But my personal view is I don’t believe in mandatory audit environments and I’ll tell 
you why. To a very large extent, especially in large complex operations, it takes time 
for one to really fully get to grips with the environment. And I see you’ve got other 
subsequent questions around we should rotate the senior, the entire senior 
leadership or just the, the lead partner as such. And frankly, for one to have proper 
institutional knowledge of that, which is institutionalised, you would need them to be 
there… I’m saying I’m not supporting mandatory firm rotation. One, because frankly I 
don’t think it has a bearing on independence. Like I say, I think we’ve got enough 
safeguards in the current systems to manage and govern independence.” 
 
Quote 40 (Audit Partner 5)  
“So I’m saying there’s a lot there that’s going to lighten or reduce the expectation 
gap when it comes to stakeholders and users, because they’ll be able to read each 
audit report [which] will be specific.  It’s not going to be a template.  They will be 
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able to understand... And independence and all of that, rather than just coming with 
a rule if it’s mandatory. We are principles-based at the end of the day. And we’re 
relying on judgement from the profession and from the Audit Committee. Both sides 
of the engagement are applying their minds and their skills and they’re qualified to 
do so… Doesn’t that make us a profession? That fact that we exercise professional 
judgement? We don’t tick boxes. The more we tick boxes… that will directly affect 
the quality of what we do. That’s where the regulator needs to get a balance... I 
hope common sense prevails. I think we’ve got a lot of checks and balances in place. I 
mean enhancing existing structures and I’m not one in favour of rules. We are 
principle-based, we must deal with it and the King Codes have done tremendous 
work over the years with the Institute of Directors.”  
 
Quote 41 (Audit Partner 10)  
“I can tell you the reality is that through all the changes the auditing profession has 
become a poor profession and I’d rather have become a heart surgeon. And maybe 
it’s a case of demand and supply, but I can tell you that [the average auditor is not 
earning as much as many professions] and something is wrong, and I know it has 
nothing to do with ethics… the reality is that through all the changes the auditing 
profession has become a poor profession… You know the heart surgeon that earns a 
huge amount of money, takes a risk and he has to work extra hard but there is risk 
and reward.  Our profession is becoming more risk. That imbalance between risk and 
reward. And it may be the worldwide economy, but I can tell you when we look at 
our [audit firm name] smaller practices or practices that do audit and other services 
in the rest of Europe and Australia, we are very, very poor, and it’s not just our 
currency.”  
 
Quote 42 (Audit Partner 5)  
“If I were to come into this, if I was entering the profession today, training contract 
today, I doubt it very much if I would have gone the same route.  And to me that is 
the cornerstone. And yes, it’s not an attractive profession when you can go out into 
commerce and industry and not have the sort of scrutiny and pressures that we have 
and have to face day in, day out, with the heightened regulations. Look we would 
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lead a comfortable life at the end of the day, but it’s not… I’m mean if I’m being 
realistic, I had a bursary with a top mining house, and [the firm name] took over that 
bursary. But if I’d stayed and gone to Johannesburg with the mining house, I would 
have been retired today.  I mean it’s plain and simple, with share options on the line. 
But I’m not upset about the choice that I’ve made, I’ve enjoyed the route that I’ve 
gone.”  
 
Quote 43 (Audit Partner 12)  
“And the youngsters who are talented that are coming through the universities are 
not staying in the profession and so there will be a decrease in [audit] quality as the 
numbers of the grey hairs start to retire from their positions, so there is a possibility 
of a quality decrease as opposed to an increase and I just think that yes I know the 
youngsters we employ every year, just none of them want to stay. We just lost a 
whole bunch of managers late last year that we were sort of grooming for 
partnership and they said thanks, but no thanks. They don’t want to be here they 
don’t want these IRBA regulations. They also don’t want the forced transformation. 
And they go overseas and certainly not stay after articles - they want to get out of 
the profession, they just don’t enjoy the pressures. And then also the other serious 
issue is you just can’t create NAV in the profession you should earn a good living and 
you live well but you live to your standard but come the end of your days you know 
you got no share options, you got no build-up of value in terms of you paying off your 
house you got a pension fund but you don’t have the kind of money that some of the 
colleagues have made by being in business. Because it [the risk in the profession] has 
gone up so dramatically and the reward hasn’t gone up so in fact the rewards has 
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Quote 44 (Audit Partner 5)  
“And there’s a lot more coming now as we know [referring to audit regulations]. This 
long form opinion [referring to ISA 701]… And you think how much time is going to 
go in to prepare that Audit Report. It’s not the willy-nilly thing, the standard 
template, make sure the thing is signed. If you imagine the debates you’re going to 
have with management around the risk areas. Audit Committee and management 
and the engagement, you know, so that’s going to have an impact. Where did we 
have differences? How were they resolved? We’re talking about material things here. 
So we’re lifting the hood of this bonnet here, this car, and giving it a much more 
thorough look. So we are narrowing the expectations gap with this Audit Report. So 
you know, all of this is all positive stuff, but it’s going to add to costs, it’s going to 
increase dialogue with management and Audit Committee. It’s going to be an added 
comfort to the various stakeholders.  Now why would you want mandatory audit firm 
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